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LICENSE TO OFFEND: HOW THE NLRA SHIELDS
PERPETRATORS OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE
WORKPLACE
Molly Gibbons*
Abstract: Congress established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board)
to enforce the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act) and ensure fair labor practices
in workplaces across the United States. The NLRA protects employees from discipline while
engaging in union activity. Under the NLRA, employers and unions must collectively bargain
in good faith. Either party may only walk a a from he able hen ano her par s cond c
makes good fai h bargaining impossible. Ho e er, he NLRB s de ermina ion of ha cond c
constitutes bad faith bargaining and protected union speech is inconsistent with federal antidiscrimination laws. This discrepancy means employers cannot take affirmative steps to
prevent hostile work environments. This Comment proposes a new approach: the NLRB
should harmonize its decisions delineating speech protected under the NLRA versus speech
that may create a hostile work environment and thus subject the employer to further liability
under federal anti-discrimination laws. Union speech or conduct that rises to the level of
harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) should be considered
o side he scope of he NLRA s pro ec ions, e en if i does no reach he c rren s andard for
bad faith bargaining or unprotected speech. This Comment argues that such harmonization
should apply irrespective of whether the offensive conduct comes from an employee or
nonemployee union member.

INTRODUCTION
An emplo er s managemen eam mee s i h a gro p of nion
represen a i es o nego ia e ne
ear s collec i e bargaining agreemen .
The first few days of bargaining proceed without issue, but then the
unexpected happens: A member of the union team begins to harass and
act aggressively towards a member of the managerial team. The union
representative calls the member of the managerial team names, insults her
looks and intelligence, gets increasingly close to her while yelling, and
uses racial and sexual slurs. This goes on for a few days. Everyone
engaged in bargaining is a are of his member s cond c and he do no
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I want to thank Mary Fan
and Hugh Spitzer for their insight and input into this Comment. I would also like to thank the Editorial
Staff of Washington Law Review for their hard work and insightful comments, especially Monica
Romero, Robert Morgan, Ian Walsh, and R.K. Brinkmann. This Comment uses offensive, sexually
and racially charged language from various cases for the purpose of illustrating the severity of the
speech that has been protected under the NLRA. However, this Comment has censored racial and
sexist slurs.
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feel like they can effectively bargain for a new contract while the harasser
is present. To protect a member of their team and make sure they can
bargain in good faith, the management team wants to end bargaining
but this is impossible. The team must negotiate until bargaining rises to
the level of bad faith, wherein good faith bargaining becomes impossible
d e o he par s presence.1 Moreover, if the union representative also
happens to be an employee, the employer cannot reprimand them for their
improper behavior because they are likely engaged in protected union
speech. If the union member is no an emplo ee, he emplo er s onl
recourse would be to remove them from the property or refuse to bargain.
However, if the managerial team took either action, essentially walking
away from the bargaining table, the employer would risk an unfair labor
practice claim. If the employer loses on this claim, it may face a financial
penalty and an order to continue negotiations until an agreement is
reached. Therefore, the employer is in a tough situation: Should it risk an
unfair labor practice charge by the union, or a harassment lawsuit from its
employee?
Under National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board)2
preceden , an emplo er s d
o bargain is discharged onl
hen an
indi id al s cond c q alifies as bad fai h bargaining.3 In certain
circumstances, this precedent allows employees to remain protected under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act)4 even when engaging
in profane, racist, or sexist outbursts.5 However, such conduct may violate
federal anti-discrimination laws under which employers have a legal
obligation to prevent and correct harassment in the workplace.6 Congress
did not give the NLRB unfettered discretion to enforce the Act in ways
that potentially conflict with federal s a es and policies nrela ed o he
1. See Pan Am. Grain Co., 343 N.L.R.B. 205, 206 (2004) (citing KDEN Broad. Co., 225 N.L.R.B.
25, 35 (1976)); see also infra section II.B.
2. The NLRB is the federal agency responsible for enforcing the National Labor Relations Act in
relation to collective bargaining agreements and unfair labor practices. Who We Are, NAT L LAB.
RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/78KT-XZFZ].
3. See Fitzsimons Mfg. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 375, 379 (1980), aff d sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 670
F.2d 663, 664 (6th Cir. 1982).
4. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 69.
5. Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 272 (1974) (noting that the
free heeling se of he ri en and spoken ord [d ring labor disp es] . . . has been expressly
fos ered b Congress and appro ed b he NLRB ).
6. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 427 29 (2013); see also Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc.,
358 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1263 (2012), vacated, No. 12-1387 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ( The Board has recogni ed
that employers have a legitimate business interest in investigating facially valid complaints of
emplo ee miscond c , incl ding complain s of harassmen . (ci ing Consol. Diesel Co., 332 N.L.R.B.
1019, 1020 (2000), enforced, 263 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2001))).
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NLRA. 7 The conflict between the NLRB s preceden and federal la s
places employers in difficult situations where their obligations under the
NLRA may put them at risk of civil liability under federal antidiscrimination laws.
This Comment examines the current legal and regulatory frameworks
for determining bad faith bargaining and protected union speech,
specifically in relation to workplace harassment under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).8 Part I outlines the history of speech
in the union context and the development of the doctrine of protected
union speech. Part II explores the duty to bargain under the NLRA. It also
addresses the concept of bad faith bargaining how it discharges the duty
to bargain and how the standard for it has evolved over the years. Part III
describes the standard for actionable workplace harassment under federal
anti-discrimination law and the conflict with NLRB precedent for
evaluating speech. Part III also examines how outlooks on harassment
have evolved drastically over time. Part IV argues that the NLRB must
continue to reconsider its protection of speech or conduct that would
otherwise be actionable under federal anti-discrimination laws. Although
the NLRB issued a new decision in July 2020 that partially disavowed its
ref sal o consider emplo ers righ o main ain a respec f l orkplace,
the opinion did not address how offensive conduct from a nonemployee
nion represen a i e o ld affec an emplo er s d
o adhere o i s
obligations under federal antidiscrimination laws and the duty to bargain
nder he NLRA. Harmoni ing he NLRB s s andards i h federal an idiscrimination laws across all contexts and parties would ensure efficient,
respectful bargaining and workplace conversations.
I.

SPEECH IN THE UNION CONTEXT

Throughout its history, the NLRB has liberally interpreted the
appropriateness of workplace speech arising from protected union
activity.9 Workers have used this leeway to zealously advocate for union
members in eres s i ho fear of an i-union retaliation.10 Once speech is
no longer protected by the NLRA, employers may discipline an employee
7. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144, 147 (2002) ( The United
S a es S preme Co r does no defer o he Na ional Labor Rela ions Board s remedial preferences
where such preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and policies unrelated to the National
Labor Relations Act. ); see infra Part IV.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
9. See Stanford N.Y., LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 564 (2005) (quoting Winston-Salem J., 341
N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (2004), enforcement denied sub nom. Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 394
F.3d 207, 208 (4th Cir. 2005)).
10. See Dreis & Krump Mfg., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 309, 315 (1975); Stanford, 344 N.L.R.B. at 564.
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for their actions, even if it occurred while engaged in union activity. This
Par addresses he NLRA s pro ec ion of nion speech ha , in some
situations, has prevented employers from disciplining employees who
engaged in harassing conduct. This Part also walks through the various
tests that the NLRB uses to analyze whether union speech loses protection
of the NLRA and the exceptions that favor protecting such speech.
A.

The National Labor Relations Act

One of the primary statutes that creates protections for worker and
union speech is the NLRA,11 which Congress enacted as a part of the New
Deal in 1935.12 The law represented a shift in workplace regulation and
set strict limits on employer rights in an effort to support and protect
collective worker action. The NLRA pro ec s orkers nion-related
speech and prohibits private employers from discriminating against or
disciplining workers for engaging in union activity.13 The Act also
guarantees emplo ees he righ o self-organi a ion and es ablishe[s] a
system by which the government would certify unions and require
emplo ers o bargain collec i el i h orkers. 14 Section 7 of the NLRA
sets out the rights of employees to engage in union activities like
bargain[ing] collec i el hro gh represen a i es of heir o n choosing
along i h concer ed ac i i ies for he p rpose of collec i e bargaining
or o her m al aid or pro ec ion. 15
Following the passage of the NLRA, Congress established the NLRB
to enforce its provisions.16 Section 8(a) of the NLRA prohibits employers
from interfering with, restraining, coercing, or discriminating against

11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 69.
12. Kate E. Andrias, Note, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace
Representation Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415, 2422 (2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 69).
13. Id. (noting that these protections are only statutory, not rooted in the first amendment); id. at
2420 n.17 ( Emplo ee speech is pro ec ed b sec ion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act when it
in ol es concer ed ac i i ies for he p rpose of orkers m al aid or pro ec ion. The righ o free
speech as a form of concerted activity . . . may not be bargained away by union negotiators. Moreover,
the Court has ruled that the Act includes as concerted activity speech aimed at improving the
circumstances of a group of employees, even when the issue is not specific to contract negotiations.
In order to trigger the protections of the Act, worker speech must be either entwined with worker
group action or involve preparation for such action. In addition, the employer must be aware of the
concer ed ac i i . (citations omitted)).
14. Id. at 2422 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
16. 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NAT L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/aboutnlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act [https://perma.cc/S7SK-U5YX].
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employees exercising their section 7 rights.17 The NLRB enforced this
provision b no allo ing emplo ers o in erfere i h emplo ees abili
to unionize any retaliation against union activity by an employer was
considered an unfair labor practice under the Act.18
B.

Determining When Speech Loses Protection of the NLRA

While the NLRA seeks to protect concerted activity by employees, the
NLRB has es ablished bo ndaries for he Ac s speech pro ec ions o er
time. The NLRB has set forth multiple tests for determining the limits of
section 7 s pro ec ions.19 Under each of the tests, the Board applies an
objec i e s andard o de ermine he her an indi id al s s a emen or
conduct represents a physical threat.20 The Board does not consider the
subjective interpretation of the parties present for the outburst.21 As the
NLRB General Counsel noted, the Board treats racist and sexist speech
the same way it treats other vulgar or profane language: it applies different
tests depending on the situation in which the outburst occurred.22 The
Board primarily considers the context or location in which the speech
occurred as well as the severity of the speech itself.
An employee may lose the protection of the Act depending on whether
they engage in indefensible or abusive conduct as well as the overarching
context of their conduct.23 For example, the Board has devised tests for
evaluating whether protection has been lost based on if the conduct
occurred in the workplace, outside of the workplace, or during union
ac i i like picke ing. Ho e er, he NLRB s in erpre a ion of he Ac
allo s a cer ain degree of la i de o emplo ees engaged in pro ec ed

17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (3).
18. Id. § 158(a)(1), (5). It is an unfair labor practice o in erfere i h, res rain, or coerce emplo ees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the NLRA. Id. § 158(a)(1).
19. Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979) (applied for workplace outbursts); Pier Sixty,
LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505, 531 (2015) (citing Honda of Am. Mfg., 334 N.L.R.B. 746, 748 (2001))
(applied to situations occurring outside the workplace); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B.
1044, 1046 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985) (applied to outburst made on the picket
line). The Atlantic Steel test is most commonly used as it applies across the most situations.
20. See, e.g., Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.3d 22, 25 & n.2, 27 29 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (finding that the Board was correct in noting that the employee s comment that the supervisor
better bring [his] boxing gloves was not meant literally and was not reasonably threatening).
21. Id.
22. Brief of NLRB Gen. Couns. as Amicus Curiae at 10, Gen. Motors LLC & Charles Robinson,
368 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (2017) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) [hereinafter NLRB General
Counsel].
23. Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 286, 291 (9th Cir. 2011).
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cond c , e en hen emplo ees e press hemsel es in empera el . 24
The NLRB has e plained ha i pro ec s offensi e, lgar, defama or
or opprobrio s remarks ered d ring he co rse of pro ec ed ac i i ies
beca se he lang age of he shop is no he lang age of poli e
socie . 25
The Board set forth a four-factor test in Atlantic Steel Co.26 for interworkplace outbursts to determine when union speech loses its protection
under the NLRA.27 Atlantic Steel applies o si a ions in ol ing direct
communications, face-to-face in the workplace, between an employee and
a manager or s per isor. 28 The es balances: (1) he place of he
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the
emplo ee s o b rs ; and (4) he her he o b rs as, in an
a ,
pro oked b an emplo er s nfair labor prac ice. 29 No abl , hile no
every impropriety . . . places the employee beyond the protective shield
of he [A]c , 30 his lee a m s be balanced agains an emplo er s righ

24. Stanford N.Y., LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 564 (2005) (quoting Winston-Salem J., 341 N.L.R.B.
124, 126 (2004), enforcement denied sub nom. Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 394 F.3d 207,
208 (4th Cir. 2005)).
25. Dreis & Krump Mfg., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 309, 315 (1975). The Board, while acknowledging
that tempers may run high in this emotional field, that the language of the shop is not the language
of poli e socie , and ha olerance of some de ia ion from ha hich migh be he mos desirable
behavior is required, has held that offensive, vulgar, defamatory or opprobrious remarks uttered
d ring he co rse of pro ec ed ac i i ies ill no remo e ac i i ies from he Ac s pro ec ion nless
they are so flagrant, violent, or extreme as to render the individual unfi for f r her ser ice. Stanford,
344 N.L.R.B. at 564 (quoting Dreis, 221 N.L.R.B. at 315).
26. 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).
27. Id.
28. Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. 308, 311 (2014); see also Greyhound Lines, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B.
No. 123, slip op. at 10 (May 6, 2019) ( The Board has typically applied the analysis of Atlantic Steel
to situations where face-to-face orkplace con ersa ions ha e been alleged o infringe on emplo ers
righ s o main ain orkplace order. (citations omitted)).
29. Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816; see e.g., Stanford, 344 N.L.R.B. at 558 59 (2005) (finding that
the employee did not lose Act s protection when calling the manager a liar and a b[***]h, angril
poin ing a finger a him, and repea ing ha he as a f[**]king son of a b[***]h beca se he o b rs
occurred while the employee was asserting a fundamental right, it was a direct and immediate reaction
o emplo er s hrea s of discharge, and occ rred in a secl ded room a a from he emplo ee s ork
area); Felix Indus., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 195, 195 97 (2003) (finding that the employee did not lose
pro ec ion of he Ac b referring o he s per isor as a f[**]king kid hree times over a phone call
in which employee asserted his contract rights, and where circumstances make clear that the outburst
o ld no ha e occ rred b for emplo er s pro oca ion, incl ding a hrea of ermina ion for
engaging in protected activity).
30. Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 978 (2014) (quoting NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co.,
351 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965)). While the actual text of the NLRA says nothing about protecting
profane, racially charged, or sexual language or behavior, the Board in Atlantic Steel determined that
the NLRA protects such behavior under the provision in section 7 which guarantees employees the
righ o engage in o her concer ed ac i i ies for . . . other mutual aid or protection . . . . 29 U.S.C.
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to maintain order and respect. 31
In addressing the location factor, the Board clarified that where the
outburs occ rs is significan hen balancing he emplo ee s righ o
engage in section 7 ac i i
agains he emplo er s righ o main ain
order and discipline in he orkplace.32 Board decisions reflect a
dis inc ion be een o b rs s here here as li le if any risk that other
emplo ees heard he obsceni ies and hose here ha risk as high. 33 In
Atlantic Steel, he Board no ed ha an emplo er s in eres in main aining
order in he orkplace is affec ed less b a pri a e o b rs in a
manager s office away from other employees than an outburst on the work
floor i nessed b o her emplo ees. 34 An employee is more likely to lose
the protection of the NLRA when they engage in a public outburst, noticed
by others.35 However, when the employer initiates a confrontation in a
public setting, the Board will not hold this factor against the employee.36
Under the second factor, a dispute is likely protected when it involves
a discussion of key working conditions, like wages and workplace safety
complaints, grievances, or terms of a collective bargaining agreement.37
The Board reasons that such disputes are likely to produce strong, highly
emo ional responses and par ies
ill of en speak bluntly and
recklessly. 38 Because tensions often run high during these conversations,
he NLRA s pro ec ions would be seriously threatened if the employer
could insis ha an emo ional and arg men a i e poin made d ring he

§ 157.
31. Pipe Realty Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1290 n.3 (1994) (citing Thor Power Tool, 351 F.2d at
587).
32. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 978 (quoting Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 286, 292
(9th Cir. 2011)).
33. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Starbucks Corp., 679 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 2012)); see Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 10 (May 6, 2019) ( The Board has fo nd ha an emplo ee s
outburst against a supervisor in a place where other employees could hear it would tend to affect
workplace discipline by undermining he a hori of he s per isor. (quoting Kiewit Power
Constructors Co., 355 N.L.R.B. 708, 709 (2010))).
34. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 978.
35. See id.
36. See Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.3d 22, 25 27 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (accepting
the Board s reasoning that while quarrels with management are more likely to disturb the workplace
if they are made in front of fellow workers, the NLRB will not hold this against the employee when
the company picks a public scene for what is likely to lead to a quarrel ).
37. See Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 979; Greyhound Lines, slip. op. at 5.
38. Linn v. Plant Guards Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966) (noting that parties to these disputes
often embellish[] their respective positions with imprecatory language ); see Consumers Power Co.,
282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986); USPS, 360 N.L.R.B. 677, 682 (2014); Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at
978 79.
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discussion could lose the protection of the NLRA.39
When evaluating the third factor, the Board analyzes the nature of the
o b rs b aking in o acco n he emplo ee s s a emen s, ho he
employee confronted, whether they made any threats or physically hit
an one, and he emplo ee s his or of aggression.40 The Board has noted
that [i] is possible for an employee to have an outburst weigh against
him e s ill re ain [ he NLRA s] pro ec ion beca se he o her hree
[Atlantic Steel] factors weigh heavily in his favor. 41 Additionally, NLRB
precedent reflects the principle that an outburst is less severe when the
s bjec of he profani is an emplo er s polic , ra her han he emplo er
itself.42 The Board also considers orkplace norms and an emplo er s
tolerance of profanity in the workplace when analyzing whether the nature
of the outburst weighs in favor of protection.43
Finall , hen de ermining if he emplo ee s o b rs as pro oked,
the Board considers the timing of the outburst, the absence of prior similar
miscond c , and managemen s hos ili
o ards he emplo ee s
protected conduct.44 O b rs s are more likely to be protected when the
emplo er e presses hos ili o he emplo ee s er ac of complaining
than when the employer has indicated a willingness to engage on the
merits. 45 Further, threats of discharge are often considered adequate
39. USPS v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
40. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 977 80.
41. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 977 (finding that the nature of the outburst weighed against
protection because the outburst, which included comments like the employer would regre i if he
as fired and calling he emplo er a f[**]king mo her f[**]ker, a f[**]king crook, and an
a[**]hole, as an obscene and denigra ing, face-to-face, ad hominem attack against an employer
at work (citing Kiewit Power, 652 F.3d at 27 n.1); Greyhound Lines, slip op. a 10 ( Al ho gh
insubordina e cond c eighs agains pro ec ion nder he Ac , he Board dis ing ishes be een r e
ins bordina ion and beha ior ha is onl disrespec f l, r de, and defian . (citing Goya Foods, Inc.,
356 N.L.R.B. 476, 478 (2011))).
42. See Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 977; Greyhound Lines, slip. op. at 5; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
341 N.L.R.B. 796, 806 08 (2004) (concluding that the employee retained the protection of the Act
where employee used the profanity to describe the employer s policy and its effects rather than to
describe a member of management), enforced, 137 Fed. App x 360 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
43. See Traverse City Osteopathic Hosp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1061, 1061 (1982) (employee s profane
o b rs
as pro ec ed beca se
he se of profani
b hospi al personnel as no
uncommon . . . and had been olera ed in he pas ), enforced, 711 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1983); Corr.
Corp. of Am., 347 N.L.R.B. 632, 636 (2006) (emplo ee s se of profani
as pro ec ed here
profani ies ere commonl sed a he facili b [emplo ees] and s per isors alike ).
44. See Felix Indus., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 195, 196 97 (2003).
45. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 979 (comparing Overnite Transp. Co., 343 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1437
(2004) (finding employee s speech protected where the employee did not bring up the subject of
whether supervisor had committed wartime atrocities until after supervisor had refused to discuss the
employee s workplace concerns) with DirectTV U.S. DirectTV Holdings, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. 545,
559, 562 (2013) (concluding that the employee s profane outburst weighed against protection in part
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provocation for an emplo ee s o b rs weighing in favor of protection
under the NLRA.46
In cases involving statements made outside of the workplace from one
employee to another for example, statements made online the Board
applies a o ali of he circ ms ances anal sis.47 This analysis
encompasses the Atlantic Steel factors, along with workplace policies,
norms, discipline patterns, anti- nion hos ili , and he emplo ee s
previous conduct48:
(i) whether the employer maintained a specific rule prohibiting
the language used by the employee; (ii) whether the employer
generally considered language such as that used by the employee
o be offensi e; (iii) he her he emplo ee s s a emen
as
impulsive or deliberate; (iv) whether the discipline imposed upon
the employee was typical of that imposed for similar
violations . . . ;(v) whether the discipline was clearly directed at
offensive language as opposed to protected activity; (vi) whether
the record contains any record of antiunion hostility; and (vii)
whether the employee had previously engaged in similar
protected conduct without objection.49
Finally, the NLRB applies the Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc.50 test in cases
involving picket-line speech directed at employees, which examines
he her he miscond c is s ch ha , nder he circ ms ances e is ing, i
may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of
rights protected under the [NLRA]. 51
because the employee had already been told that the problem that he was again complaining to
management about would be resolved in a few days)).
46. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 978 ( Telling an employee who is engaged in protected concerted
ac i i ha he ma q i if he does no like he emplo er s policies is an implied hrea of discharge,
because it suggests that continuing to engage in such protected activity is incompatible with continued
emplo men . ); see also McDaniel Ford, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 956, 962 (1997) ( [A]n emplo er s
invitation to an employee to quit in response to their exercise of protected concerted activity is
coercive, because it conveys to employees that [engaging in] concerted activities and their continued
emplo men are no compa ible, and implici l hrea en[s] discharge of he emplo ees in ol ed. ).
47. Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1267 (2012), vacated, No. 12-1387 (D.C. Cir.
2014); see Honda of Am. Mfg., 334 N.L.R.B. 746, 747 49 (2001); Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B.
505, 531 (2015); Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. 308, 311 (2014) ( [T]he A lan ic S eel framework is
ailored o orkplace confron a ions i h he emplo er. ).
48. Pier Sixty, 362 N.L.R.B. at 531.
49. Id. (citing Honda, 334 N.L.R.B. at 748).
50. 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).
51. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1046; see also Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B.
810, 812 (2006) (no ing ha he Board has fo nd ha a s riker s se of he mos ile and lgar
language, including racial epithets, does not deprive him of the protection of the Act, so long as those
actions do no cons i e a hrea ); De roi Ne spaper Agenc , 342 N.L.R.B. 223, 268 (2004)

Gibbons (Do Not Delete)

1502

10/15/2020 10:54 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1493

When anal ing he na re and se eri of he emplo ee s o b rs
under the above tests, the Board often applies two principles: the realities
of industrial life and the norms of the workplace.52 The Board is more
illing o find ha an emplo ee s speech is pro ec ed nder he NLRA if
that speech is representative of the realities of industrial life or tolerated
within the specific workplace.53
1.

Realities of Industrial Life

The Board has consis en l applied a reali ies of ind s rial life
principle hen e al a ing he her an emplo ee s profani or offensi e
language loses protection under the NLRA.54 This principle implies that
profanity, vulgarity, or obscenity in the course of labor relations is
presumptively permissible in any industrial workplace.55 The Board has
insisted that the protections section 7 affords emplo ees
o ld be
meaningless if i did no o ake in o acco n he reali ies of ind s rial
life and the fact that disputes over wages, hours, and working conditions
are among the disputes most likely to engender ill feelings and strong
responses. 56 While much has changed since the passage of the NLRA,
the Board continues to find that the language of the workplace is not
considered he lang age of poli e socie . 57 Additionally, the Board
has obser ed ha passions r n high in labor disp es and ha epi he s
and acc sa ions are commonplace. 58 Accordingl , a cer ain amo n of
sal lang age and defiance is o be e pec ed and m s be olera ed in
disp es o er emplo ees erms and condi ions of emplo men . 59 For
(finding an employee s speech pro ec ed hen he said o f[**]kin b[***]h, n[****]r lo in
h[*]re during a strike).
52. See infra section I.B.1.
53. See infra section I.B.1.
54. See Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986). Federal courts have also appeared
to honor this exception. See NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206 07 (7th Cir. 1971).
55. Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1269 (2012) (Member Hayes, dissenting),
vacated, No. 12-1387 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 978 79 (2014).
56. Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. at 132.
57. Stanford N.Y., LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 564 (2005); see Kiewit Power Constructors Co., 355
N.L.R.B. 708, 710 (2010) ( [T]he Board has fo nd ha a line is dra n be een cases where
employees engaged in concerted activities that exceed the bounds of lawful conduct in a moment of
animal exuberance or in a manner not motivated by improper motives and those flagrant cases in
which the misconduct is so violent or of such a character as to render the employee unfit for further
service. ).
58. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 18 (May 6, 2019) (citing Atl. Steel
Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 819 (1979)).
59. Id., slip op. at 4 (quoting Severance Tool Indus., 301 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1170 (1991), enforced,
953 F.2d 1384 (6th Cir. 1992)).
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example, Consumers Power Co.60 involved an employee who was upset
over unsafe work conditions and protested to his supervisor.61 The
employee used abusive profanity against the supervisor, shook his finger
in he s per isor s face, and s pposedl s r ck he s per isor in he
chest.62 Since he emplo ee s ac ions occ rred in he hea of he momen ,
while the employee was protesting the safety of work conditions, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that they were protected under
section 7 of the NLRA.63 Likewise, in Greyhound Lines, Inc.,64 the ALJ
held ha he NLRA shielded he emplo ee s o b rs , hich in ol ed
sho ing profani ies like f[**]k o , because he was engaged in union
activity and his language was not so egregious as to lose protection under
the Act.65 The ALJ made clear that his finding was consis en i h he
Board s reasoning ha a cer ain amo n of sal lang age and defiance
is to be e pec ed and m s be olera ed in disp es o er emplo ees
erms and condi ions of emplo men . 66
2.

Norms of the Workplace

The Board also applies he norms of he orkplace principle hen
de ermining if an emplo ee s o b rs is pro ec ed b he NLRA.67
Specificall , he Board looks a
he her profani [or obsceni ] is
commonplace and tolerated in he orkplace.68 If it is, the nature of the
outburst supports retaining protection of the Act because a profane
60. 282 N.L.R.B. 130 (1986).
61. Id. at 130 31.
62. Id. at 131.
63. Id. at 137. The ALJ noted that the employee s action was a reflexive reaction and that physical
con ac , if an , as modera e and amo n ed o no hing more han Knigh s hand br shing agains
S per isor C rrie s ches . There as no a emp ed blow, threatening gesture, or threatening words by
Knight and no other contact between the two men occurred. Id. The Board affirmed he ALJ s
decision, noting that
Knigh raised his fis s o C rrie refle i el , responding o C rrie s mo ing his hands in front of
Knigh as if o ges re or shake a finger in Knigh s face. Knigh as admi edl ho nder he
collar . . . [but] never struck a blow . . . . We like ise do no find Knigh s la er cond c so
egregious as to lose the protection of the Act now.
Id. at 132.
64. 367 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (May 6, 2019).
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting USPS, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. a 4 (J l 29, 2016) ( In addi ion, he Board
and he co r s ha e recogni ed ha some olerance is necessar if grie ance mee ings are o s cceed
a all, and br ised sensibili ies ma be he price e ac ed for ind s rial peace. (q o ing USPS .
NLRB, 652 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981))).
67. Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 2 (Sept. 5, 2019).
68. Id.
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outburst is considered less distressing and disruptive to the work
en ironmen and he manager s abili
o main ain order.69 NLRB
decisions imply that profanity in the course of labor relations is a
permissible norm in most workplaces.70 In Traverse City Osteopathic
Hospital,71 the NLRA protected an emplo ee s se of obscene and lgar
language while he engaged in union activity because the employer had
tolerated the language in the past and no other employees who witnessed
the outburst complained about the language used.72 However, in
Aluminum Co. of America,73 the Board noted that even if profanity in a
orkplace is common, an emplo ee s profani can be so egregio s as o
weigh against protection under the NLRA due to its extreme degree and
individualized character.74
If an emplo ee s speech falls i hin either principle, the above tests
favor protecting that speech under the NLRA. However, workplace
speech that fits within these principles may create a hostile work
environment and would thus be unlawful under federal antidiscrimination laws.75
II.

BAD FAITH BARGAINING

While the NLRA protects union speech in a variety of workplace
contexts, a specific intersection of union activity and speech exists during
69. Gre ho nd Lines, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. a 10 (Ma 6, 2019) ( [T]he Board has
held ha here he se of profane and lgar lang age as a dail occ rrence in [ he] Responden s
orkplace, and [i ] did no engender an disciplinar response, s ch a fac or eighed in fa or of
retaining the protection of the Act. (citing Pier Sixty, LLC 362 N.L.R.B. 505, 505 06 (2015)); see
Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 983 (2014) (Member Johnson, dissenting).
70. See Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1269 (2012) (Member Hayes, dissenting),
vacated, No. 12-1387 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Corr. Corp. of Am., 347 N.L.R.B. 632, 636 (2006) (finding
that an employee s use of profanity was protected by the Act where profanities were commonly used
a he facili b [emplo ees] and s per isors alike ).
71. 260 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1982), enforced, 711 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1983).
72. Id. at 1069 70. The Board affirmed he ALJ s decision, finding ha :
Aldridge s o b rs as no so flagran or egregio s as o remo e him from he pro ec ion of he
Act. We note . . . that the use of profanity by hospital personnel was not uncommon, including
i s se in he cafe eria, and had been olera ed in he pas , ha Aldridge s profane o b rs as,
o some degree, pro oked b emplo ee Jess p s in empera e and profane commen s o Aldridge
regarding nioni a ion and Aldridge s f re job status, that Jessup herself frequently used
profanity in conversations with other employees, that the outburst was made during nonworking
time outside of a patient care area, and that there were apparently few nonemployee visitors in
the cafeteria at the time in question and no evidence that any complaints, other than by Jessup,
ere made o managemen regarding Aldridge s cond c .
Id. at 1061 62.
73. 338 N.L.R.B. 20 (2002).
74. Id. at 21 22.
75. See infra Part III.
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bargaining. This Part addresses the duties of employers and unions to
bargain in good faith and the right to choose representatives, as the NLRA
only allows parties to walk away from the table if bargaining in good faith
becomes impossible. It then discusses how certain speech, or conduct, can
ultimately lead to bad faith bargaining, such that it loses protection under
the NLRA. However, the NLRB has articulated an incredibly high
standard for bad faith bargaining, thereby forcing parties to sometimes
tolerate significant outbursts or harassment. This sets up another potential
conflict between federal anti-discrimination laws and protected union
speech. This Part concludes with examples of bad faith bargaining cases
that distinguish between impermissible and permissible conduct under the
NLRA.
A.

Duty to Bargain in Good Faith

The duty to bargain in good faith is one of the key concepts of collective
bargaining. The NLRA76 is one of the most well-known federal acts
governing collective bargaining, along with other union activity.77 Under
he NLRA, pri a e emplo ers have a legal duty to bargain in good faith
i h heir emplo ees represen a i e and o sign an collec i e bargaining
agreemen ha has been reached. 78 Section 8(d) of the NLRA sets forth
the requirements for collective bargaining.79 Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA
makes i an nfair labor prac ice for an emplo er o ref se o bargain
collec i el
i h he represen a i es of i s emplo ees nless cer ain
criteria are met.80 Under section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA, a union must also
bargain in good faith on behalf of the employees it represents.81 Pursuant
to the NLRA, if a union or employer believes that the other party has failed
76. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 69.
77. State statutes govern the collective bargaining duties for state employers and employees. See,
e.g., WASH REV. CODE. § 41.56 (2019) (describing Washington State s regulations for public
employees collective bargaining).
78. Bargaining in Good Faith with Employees Union Representative (Section 8(d) & 8(a)(5)),
NAT L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/bargaininggood-faith-employees-union-representative-section [https://perma.cc/D47X-T396] ( An emplo er
that violates Section 8(a)(5) also derivatively violates Section 8(a)(1). ).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) ( [Obliga ion o bargain collec i el ] For he p rposes of his sec ion, o
bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached . . . . ).
80. Id. § 158(a)(5).
81. Id. § 158(b)(3).
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to bargain in good faith, it may file an unfair labor practice complaint.82
This could lead to remedies ordered by the NLRB.83
B.

Right to Choose Representatives

Within the collective-bargaining rela ionship, each par has bo h he
righ o selec he represen a i e for bargaining and nego ia ions and he
d
o deal i h he chosen represen a i e of he o her par . 84 Section 7
of the NLRA gives employees the right to bargain collectively with
representatives of their choosing.85 And it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees exercising
that right.86
However, the righ o selec one s bargaining represen a i es is no
absolute.87 If he presence of one s represen a i e in nego ia ions makes
collec i e bargaining impossible or f ile, he o her par is relie ed of
its duty to deal with that particular individual thus limi ing one s righ
to choose their representative.88 These limitations have generally been
confined o si a ions infec ed i h ill-will, usually personal, or conflict
of interest as to make good-fai h bargaining imprac ical. 89
C.

Refusal to Bargain

Given the established duty to bargain under the NLRA, a union or an
emplo er can onl ref se o bargain i h an opposing par s
represen a i e if ha person s cond c is so egregio s and be ond he
pale as o make he bargaining process i self n enable. 90 For a party to
82. Id. § 158.
83. Id.
84. Victoria Packing Corp., 332 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 (2000); see also Pan Am. Grain Co., 343
N.L.R.B. 205, 206 (2004) (citing Fitzsimons Mfg. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 375, 379 (1980), aff d sub nom.
UAW v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1982)).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
86. Id. § 158(a)(1).
87. See Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 296 N.L.R.B. 51, 71 (1989) ( [A]n emplo er can ref se o
deal with a union representative whose conduct has crossed over a line of permissible conduct
es ablished b he Board and he co r s. ).
88. Victoria Packing, 332 N.L.R.B. at 600 (quoting Fitzsimons, 251 N.L.R.B. at 379).
89. Long Island, 296 N.L.R.B. at 71 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir.
1969)).
90. Victoria Packing, 332 N.L.R.B. at 600; see also Sahara Datsun, 278 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046
(1986) ( When an individual engages in conduct directed at the employer or its representatives which
engenders such ill will that it weakens the fabric of the relationship to the extent that good-faith
bargaining is impossible, ho e er, e recogni e an emplo er s righ o ref se o mee and bargain
with that individual. ).
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be relie ed of i s d
o bargain, here m s be pers asi e e idence ha
the presence of the particular individual would create ill will and make
good-fai h bargaining impossible. 91 Even behavior that does not occur
during the bargaining session can still undermine the overall bargaining
process.92 According to the Board, this high standard for relieving the duty
o bargain is appropria e beca se he obliga ion o bargain also imposes
he obliga ion o hicken one s skin and o carr on e en in the face of
ha o her ise
o ld be r de and naccep able beha ior. 93
Additionally, the determination as to whether a representative has acted
in s ch a a ha his or her presence o ld make good-faith bargaining
impossible is essen iall a fac al inq ir . 94 The standard is not based
on he s bjec i e asser ed reac ions of indi id al bargainers; he NLRB
makes an objec i e de ermina ion of he her he cond c is reasonabl
likely [to] create ill will . . . . 95
D.

Recent Case Examples of Conduct That Renders Bargaining
Impossible

Generally, profanity or vulgar language is insufficient to constitute bad
faith bargaining.96 Ins ead, he NLRB s applica ion of he bad fai h
bargaining es has pheld an emplo er s ref sal o bargain i h a nion
represen a i e onl
here he represen a i e s cond c as egregio s,
such as physical assaults or death threats.97
91. Pan Am. Grain Co., 343 N.L.R.B. 205, 206 (2004) (citing KDEN Broad. Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 25,
35 (1976)).
92. King Soopers, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 269, 270 (2002) (citing Sahara Datsun, 278 N.L.R.B. at
1046 47).
93. Victoria Packing, 332 N.L.R.B. at 600.
94. Pan Am. Grain, 343 N.L.R.B. at 206.
95. Ready Mix USA, LLC, No. 10-CA-140059, 2015 WL 5440337 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 15, 2015)
(finding that even if the bargainers subjectively felt like the employee s presence would make
bargaining impossible, it was a reasonable person s reaction that mattered).
96. See, e.g., KSL Claremont Resort, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 835 (2005) ( The standards for
behavior in negotiations are much different than the standards of conduct for an employee in a luxury
hotel. . . . Thus, to the extent a [party] becomes visibly upset, shaking, or out of control . . . ,
negotiations, in general, have been known to accommodate such behavior. Negotiations may also
accommodate some profanity. ).
97. Victoria Packing, 332 N.L.R.B. at 600 (citing Sahara Datsun, 278 N.L.R.B. at 1044); see also
Pan Am. Grain, 343 N.L.R.B. at 206; cf. Neilmed Prods., Inc., No. 20-CA-35363, 2011 WL 2689292
(N.L.R.B. July 11, 2011). In Neilmed Products, Inc., the ALJ found that the employer violated the
NLRA by denying a union representative access to the bargaining table because the union
representative had yelled angry comments at employees crossing a picket line and had broken the
windshield of a passing car. Id. They determined that the representative s conduct and presence during
bargaining did not amount to bad faith bargaining. Id. While this Comment notes that the standard for
what constitutes bad faith bargaining is likely outdated and needs adjusting, it is beyond scope of this
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Sit ations Where an Emplo er s Ref sal to Bargain Was Upheld

In Fitzsimmons Manufacturing Co.,98 he NLRB pheld an emplo er s
refusal to bargain after a physical altercation between a Union
representative and the emplo er s personnel direc or.99 The representative
believed that the personnel director had disclosed confidential material to
he Union s bargaining commi ee.100 The representative grabbed the
direc or b his ie, said he o ld p nch him in he face and knock him
on his ass, and s gges ed ha he go o side and figh .101 This
altercation occurred during a grievance meeting, without provocation, and
in the presence of other employees.102 The employer then requested that
the Union remove him as the representative for its facility.103 The Union
repeatedly assured the employer that an outburst like that would not
happen again and the representative would control his behavior.104
However, the employer refused to bargain with the Union unless the
representative was removed.105
The Board concl ded ha he emplo er s ref sal o bargain i h he
Union as la f l beca se he represen a i e s cond c as s fficien l
egregious as to render good faith bargaining impossible.106 The Board
rested its conclusion on the fact that the representative assaulted the
director and his conduct was unprovoked.107 Since the assault occurred
after the parties had stopped discussing any topics of dispute, there was
no j s ifica ion for he represen a i e s ini ial se of ph sical force or his
attempt to continue the confrontation.108 Moreo er, he represen a i e s
behavior was disruptive to bargaining because his outburst took place in
the presence of the employee bargaining committee whose members
looked to the representative for leadership and the emplo er s
management officials.109 The Board did not alter its conclusion, despite

Comment.
98. 251 N.L.R.B. 375 (1980), aff d sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1982).
99. Id. at 376, 379.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 376.
102. Id. at 376, 379.
103. Id. at 376 77.
104. Id. at 377.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 379.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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he Union s ass rances ha he represen a i e had no pre io sl
assa l ed he emplo er s officials and o ld no ac o again, and he
fact that the director later departed from he emplo er s managemen
team.110 While a pa ern of assa l s ma j s if a par s ref sal o mee
with a particular representative, the Board noted in this case that it can
also find the refusal to bargain justified on other grounds.111
King Soopers, Inc.112 featured an altercation between a supervisor and
a long-time employee.113 The employee, who had previously been a union
s e ard, confron ed his s per isor abo
he emplo er s decision o
schedule him for a Saturday shift.114 During the confrontation, the
emplo ee angrily threw his meathook over his shoulder, narrowly
missing [ano her] emplo ee. 115 The emplo ee also hre a 40-pound
piece of meat into a saw (breaking its blade); threw his knife into a box;
threatened his supervisor; and refused to follow he s ore manager s order
o lea e he s ore. 116 Before his inciden , he emplo ee had placed his
hand o er he s ore manager s mo h d ring a disc ssion i h her. 117 The
employer terminated the employee, citing his threatening and violent
behavior.118 Four years later, the Union hired the former employee as a
business agent and assigned him to duties at his former store.119 Once the
employer learned that the agent would be entering the workplace as a
business agent, it told the Union it would not deal with him regarding
union matters because of his violent past.120
The Board held that the employer did not violate the NLRA by refusing
o deal i h he Union s b siness agen , since he agen had pre io sl
engaged in violent and disruptive behavior during minor disputes, such as

110. Id. at 379 80 ( [W]e find ha nei her he informal se lemen agreemen nor he Union s
ass rances are s fficien o dissipa e he effec of Mas os cond c . . . . Mas os cond c as no
prompted by personal animosity towards Vogel. Rather, Mastos responded as he did because he
believed that Vogel would refer to matters previously resolved through collective bargaining. In these
circumstances, Respondent could reasonably fear that similar attacks might occur if other of
Responden s officials men ioned he Oc ober 1977 meeting or any other subject of collective
bargaining as to which Mastos might be or become sensitive. ).
111. Id. at 380.
112. 338 N.L.R.B. 269 (2002).
113. Id. at 269.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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scheduling issues.121 This egregio s miscond c mean ha indi id als
required to deal with him in an adversarial setting, like a grievance
mee ing, migh reasonabl be preocc pied i h he legi ima e concern
ha he o ld reac iolen l if his posi ion did no pre ail. 122 That
preoccupation might undermine good faith collective bargaining by
impeding a igoro s e change of posi ions nenc mbered b he hrea
of an ad ersar s iolen reac ion. 123 Th s, he agen s propensi o reac
violently during disputes would make good faith bargaining impossible.124
Finally, the Board found that the absence of physical injury or intent to
ca se ph sical inj r
as irrele an o i s concl sion ha he agen s
presence would cause ill-will.125
2.

Sit ations Where an Emplo er s Ref sal to Bargain Was Held
Unlawful

In Victoria Packing Corp.,126 a Union representative became
confron a ional and aggressi e
i h a compan s o ner.127 The
represen a i e elled, I m going o ge o and o r f[**]king compan
while aggressively shaking his finger at the compan s o ner, ho old
him that he could not talk to employees during work hours.128 The Board
concl ded ha he emplo er s ref sal o allo he Union represen a i e
to be present at its workplace violated its duty to bargain.129 It found that
the Union represen a i e s cond c co ld no reasonabl be cons r ed as
ain ing he bargaining process as long as he as personall in ol ed. 130
While he represen a i e s cond c ma ha e been r de and e en
e cessi e in a social or b siness con e , i as of a shor d ra ion, did
121. Id. at 269 70 (noting that the employee s violent outburst prior to termination clearly
jeopardized the safety of a supervisor and a fellow employee ).
122. Id. at 269.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 269 70 ( The fact that Gonzales has had nonviolent encounters as a shop steward in the
past as well as some nonviolent encounters with employers in his capacity as a business agent is of
limited significance in resolving the issue at hand, namely, whether his tendency to react violently
during a confrontation j s ifies he Responden s ref sal o deal i h him. ).
125. Id. a 270 ( Gon ales beha ior as plainl reckless, and al ho gh he migh ha e ac ed
without a subjective intent to cause physical injury when he narrowly missed striking an employee
with a meathook, this does not mitigate or change how it would reasonably be perceived by
bystanders, and thus does not ameliorate the potentially debilitating effect on bargaining. ).
126. 332 N.L.R.B. 597 (2000).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 599.
129. Id. at 597 98.
130. Id. at 600.
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not involve any kind of physical contact or explicit threat of force,
and . . . was a one time event in an otherwise business like and productive
rela ionship be een he Union and he Emplo er. 131
In Long Island Jewish Medical Center,132 a Union business agent
engaged in repea ed confron a ions i h he emplo er s hospi al s aff. In
one incident, he pushed a hospital adminis ra or, called her an asshole
multiple times, and briefly blocked her from accessing her desk.133 During
a second incident, the agent directed obscenities at hospital staff.134 The
final incident involved the agent handing out leaflets to hospital staff
about the upcoming union meetings.135 As the agent was handing out
leaflets, a hospital administrator took the leaflets, handed them back to the
agent, and then pushed him.136 The agent then did the same to the
administrator.137 The employer subsequently banned the business agent
from the hospital.138 The Board fo nd ha he b siness agen s ac s d ring
the final incident, which formed the crux of the allegation, were provoked
by the hospital administrator.139 F r her, hile he b siness agen s
actions were not condoned, they were not sufficiently egregious to justify
the employer refusing to bargain with the business agent.140 In light of all
hree inciden s, he NLRB concl ded ha he b siness agen s presence a
bargaining would not cause ill-will or make future bargaining
impossible.141
These decisions illustrate that, in some circumstances, behavior such
as shoving supervisors, shouting profanities on numerous occasions, and
becoming confrontational does not amount to bad faith bargaining. When
the NLRB does find the bad faith bargaining standard to be met, it is often

131. Id.
132. 296 N.L.R.B. 51 (1989).
133. Id. at 71.
134. Id. at 57 ( Nordenberg immedia el began elling: To gh shi , I don need o r permission,
I m going o do ha I an o do . . . screw you o don kno he con rac . She said: I do kno
he con rac ; no is no he ime o be here. Carnel hen called sec ri , and told them that she needed
a security officer . . . . She then walked out of her office and saw that Nordenberg was walking toward
the front of the office. . . . When he reached he fron , Nordenberg as in he corridor elling: Yo
don kno he contract scre o , o re an asshole. ).
135. Id. at 57 59.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 60.
139. Id. at 72.
140. Id. ( An emplo er canno rel on an emplo ee s indiscre ion o j s if a discharge hen i
was provoked by an agent of the employer. ).
141. Id.
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due to the presence of a physical altercation or threats of physical
iolence. Accordingl , he NLRB s decisions ha e es ablished a high
standard as to what rises to the level of bad faith bargaining, and in doing
so, sometimes protect otherwise harassing conduct.
III. HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: INTERPLAY
BETWEEN FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
NLRA
The NLRB decisions abo e foc s on he scope of an emplo er s d
to bargain in good faith with union representatives, but employers must
also comply with a host of other employment laws. Federal antidiscrimination laws may be invoked alongside the NLRA in situations
involving the types of harassing conduct described above.142 This Part
addresses what constitutes actionable workplace harassment under federal
anti-discrimination laws, specifically Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.143 This Part then discusses employer liability for workplace
harassment and its duty to establish a safe, harassment-free work
environment. It gives examples that illustrate the interplay between
workplace conduct that violates federal anti-discrimination law, but,
under current precedent, may remain protected under the NLRA. Finally,
this Part concludes by suggesting that the norms of appropriate workplace
beha ior ha e e ol ed o er he ears, and ha he NLRB s s andards ha e
largely overlooked these changes.
A.

Actionable Harassment in the Workplace Under Federal AntiDiscrimination Laws

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge, refuse to hire,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
s ch indi id al s race, color, religion, se , or na ional origin. 144 The
142. See infra section III.C. Federal anti-discrimination laws and the NLRA both address the lawful
or unlawful workplace speech or conduct. However, the two are distinct in that the NLRA applies
specifically to union speech while federal anti-discrimination laws apply to all workplace speech.
While State laws may also impose anti-discrimination obligations for an employer, this Comment
focuses solely on federal law.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
144. Id. Title VII s prohibition on discrimination extends to a prohibition on harassment based on
the same protected traits. See, e.g., Diaz v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 318 F.3d 796, 799 801 (8th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that harassment based on national origin was actionable where Hispanic employees were
mocked about their accent and told Hispanics sho ld be cleaning and Hispanics are s pid );
Forres . Brinker In l Pa roll Co., 511 F.3d 225, 229 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that case law
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la s prohibi ion on discrimina ion i h respec o erms, condi ions, or
pri ileges of emplo men co ers harassmen in ol ing a pro ec ed
charac eris ic ha crea e[s] a hos ile or ab si e ork en ironmen . 145
Title VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who
oppose
nla f l emplo men prac ice[s]. 146 The Americans with
Disabilities Act147 (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act148 (ADEA) prohibit workplace discrimination and harassment based
on a disability149 and age,150 respectively. An employer could violate
federal anti-discrimina ion la
hen he orkplace is permea ed i h
discrimina or in imida ion, ridic le, and ins l , ha is s fficien l
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the vic im s emplo men and
crea e an ab si e orking en ironmen . 151 But not all workplace
harassment is actionable under federal law.152
To be actionable under federal anti-discrimination law, workplace
harassmen m s be objec i el hos ile or ab si e and he victim must
s bjec i el percei e he en ironmen o be [hos ile or] ab si e. 153

es ablishes ha he se of se all degrading, gender-specific epithets, such as . . . b[***]h, . . . has
been consis en l held o cons i e harassmen based pon se ).
145. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); Reeves v. C.H. Robinson
World ide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 809 (11 h Cir. 2010) ( Ti le VII does no prohibi profani alone,
however profane. It does not prohibit harassment alone, however severe and pervasive. Instead,
Title VII prohibits discrimination, including harassment that discriminates based on a protected
category such as sex. (quoting Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1301 02
(11th Cir. 2007))).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 623.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see, e.g., Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 3, 7 8 (1st Cir. 2006)
(affirming jury verdict under ADA for harassment based on the employee s disability where the
evidence demonstrated that the employee s supervisors mocked him, made comments to other
employees, and drove a truck at him while he crossed a street).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); see, e.g., Davis-Garett v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 921 F.3d 30, 42 (2d Cir.
2019) (reversing the district court s grant of summary judgment to defendants on the plaintiff s age
harassment claim because a triable issue of material fact existed as to plaintiff s claim of a hostile
work environment based on daily age-disparaging cri icisms direc ed a he plain iff).
151. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations omitted) (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 67 (1986)).
152. See id.
153. Id. at 21 22 ( So long as he en ironment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived,
as hos ile or ab si e, here is no need for i also o be ps chologicall inj rio s. (ci a ions omi ed));
see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2001); Fuller v. City of Oakland,
47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9 h Cir. 1995) ( Whe her he orkplace is objec i el hos ile m s be de ermined
from he perspec i e of a reasonable person i h he same f ndamen al charac eris ics. ). Workplace
harassment based on protected characteristics is only actionable under Title VII if i is s fficien l
se ere or per asi e o al er he condi ions of [ he ic im s] emplo men and crea e an ab si e orking
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Courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
determine whether the harassment was sufficiently hostile or abusive by
looking at the totality of the circumstances.154 These can incl de he
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
he her i
nreasonabl in erferes
i h an emplo ee s
ork
155
performance.
However, no single factor is required for a claim of
workplace harassment to succeed.156
With specific regard to workplace sexual harassment claims, the
totality of the circumstances analysis generally includes consideration of
he harasser s s a s, ho i nessed he harassment, where the harassment
occurred, how often the harassment occurred, what the outburst involved,
and the social context in which the outburst occurred.157 Courts may
consider whether the harasser was a supervisor, coworker, or nonemployee.158 Harassmen from a s per isor is inheren l more se ere
han ha of a co orker beca se of he s per isor s a hori o er he
employee. 159 A co orker s harassmen , ho e er, can also lead o a
hostile work environment.160 Harassment is generally most severe when
en ironmen . Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
154. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (b) (2019). The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission s Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex require the Commission to
assess the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an individual s claim of sexual
harassment in the workplace is actionable. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (b).
155. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir.
2008) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
156. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
157. Id. ( These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
in erferes i h an emplo ee s ork performance. ); Martinez v. Marin Sanitary Serv., 349 F. Supp.
2d 1234, 1253 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ( When he harassmen comes from a s per isor, ra her han a
co orker, he cond c ma be considered more se ere. ); Brooks . Ci of San Ma eo, 229 F.3d 917,
927 (9th Cir. 2000) ( [A] se al assa l b a s per isor, e en on a single occasion, ma
ell be
sufficiently severe so as to alter the conditions of employment and give rise to a hostile work
en ironmen claim. ).
158. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., No. C94-790C, 1995 WL 569446, at *3 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 8, 1995) (noting that Title VII protects employees from harassment instigated by nonemployees).
159. Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 10, Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (2017) (Cases
14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) [hereinafter EEOC]; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) ( [A] s per isor s po er and a hori in es s his or her harassing conduct
with a particular threatening character . . . . ); Bo er-Liberto v. Fountainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264,
278 (4 h Cir. 2015) (en banc) ( In meas ring he se eri of harassing cond c , he s a s of he
harasser may be a significant factor . . . . ).
160. Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 55 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding that a reasonable
trier of fact could determine that a hostile work environment existed based on evidence that the
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directed at a specific individual, although indirect harassment can create
a hostile work environment as well.161 Courts have also concluded that
harassment might be more severe when it occurs in the presence of
others.162
The frequency and gravity of the conduct is also important for a court
o consider in de ermining if harassmen mee s he se ere or per asi e
requirement.163 Even isolated incidents of severe harassment can be
actionable, especially if the harassment is sexual or race-based.164
Furthermore, harassment can meet the sufficiently severe requirement
even if it is not physically threatening.165 Finally, the social context in
hich beha ior occ rs and is e perienced b i s arge is also impor an
in determining whether the harassment created a hostile work
environment.166 The objec i e hos ili of he harassmen req ires an
plain iff s co orker s bjec ed her o h milia ing se al remarks and inn endos ); see also infra
section III.B.
161. See, e.g., Ellis v. CCA of Tenn. LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 647 n.2 (7 h Cir. 2011) ( [S]econdhand
harassmen is less se ere han firs hand harassmen . ); see also Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide,
Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 811 (11 h Cir. 2010) ( I is eno gh o hear co-workers on a daily basis refer to
female colleag es as b[***]hes,
h[*]res and c[*]n s, o nders and ha he ie
omen
negatively, and in a humiliating or degrading way. The harasser need not close the circle with
reference o he plain iff specificall : and o are a b[***]h, oo. ); Adams v. Austal, USA, LLC,
754 F.3d 1240, 1253 (11 h Cir. 2014) (no ing ha hile a noose in breakroom is a se ere form of
racial harassmen , he plain iff s e perience as less se ere beca se he did no see i firs hand ).
162. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000).
163. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest.
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001) ( The req ired le el of se eri or serio sness aries
in ersel i h he per asi eness or freq enc of he cond c . [S]imple easing, offhand commen s,
and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the
erms and condi ions of emplo men . (ci a ions omi ed)).
164. Ellison . Brad , 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9 h Cir. 1991) ( [T]he req ired sho ing of se eri y or
seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the
cond c . ); Gerald . Uni . of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 18 (1s Cir. 2013) (concl ding ha plain iff
successfully established a hostile work environment claim where her male supervisor grabbed her
breast and made sexually suggestive noises); Rosemond v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 456 F.
S pp. 2d 204, 213 (D. Mass. 2006) (concl ding ha a reasonable j r co ld de ermine ha he noose
incident, standing alone, was objectively hos ile or ab si e and crea ed a hos ile ork en ironmen
(emphasis in original)); Ayissi Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding that
a single inciden migh ell ha e been s fficien o es ablish a hos ile ork en ironmen in a case
in ol ing a s per isor ho sed a deepl offensi e racial epi he [ n****r ] hen elling a [ he
emplo ee] o ge o of he office ).
165. EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 318 (4 h Cir. 2008) ( Names can h r as m ch
as sticks and stones, and the Supreme Court has never indicated that the humiliation so frequently
a ached o hos ile en ironmen s need be accompanied b ph sical hrea or force. ).
166. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 82 (1998) ( A professional
foo ball pla er s orking en ironmen is no se erel or per asi el ab si e, for e ample, if he
coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field even if the same behavior would
reasonabl be e perienced as ab si e b he coach s secre ar (male or female) back a he office. ).
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appropria e sensi i i
o social con e . 167 This sensitivity to social
con e
helps co r s o dis ing ish be een simple easing or
roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a
reasonable person in he plain iff s posi ion o ld find se erel hos ile or
abusive. 168
Although context matters under the Title VII totality of circumstances
analysis, courts have refused to grant leeway to employees who make
racist or sexist comments despite an alleged workplace norm.169 Contrary
to NLRB precedent regarding the scope of acceptable conduct in a
workplace bargaining context, courts interpreting Title VII have
consistently held that there is no crude work environment or industrial life
workplace justification for offensive language.170 Further, there is no
exception under Title VII for offensive comments made by an employee
who has impassioned feelings about workplace matters.171 Under Title
VII, severe or pervasive harassment based on a protected characteristic is
unlawful if it is both objectively and subjectively hostile there is no
statutory safeguard for discriminatory behavior based on norms of the
workplace.172
B.

Employer Liability for Workplace Harassment

Courts and agencies have held that an employer can be liable for
workplace harassment, but the degree of liability depends on the
perpetra or s iden i
as ei her a s per isor, co orker, or nonemployee.173 Employers are vicariously liable174 for a hostile work
167. Id. at 82 (The real social impac of orkplace beha ior of en depends on a cons ella ion of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. ).
168. Id.
169. See Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 318.
170. See id. ( Ti le VII con ains no [] cr de en ironmen e cep ion, and o read one in o i migh
i ia e s a or safeg ards for hose ho need hem mos . ); Q iles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d
1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that an employer could not argue that daily harassment about the
emplo ee s disabili
as no ac ionable beca se ha pe of cond c is common in bl e-collar
orkplaces ); Smi h . Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 535 (7 h Cir. 1999); cf. Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360
N.L.R.B. 972, 978 79 (2014).
171. Susan Carle, Angry Employees: Revisiting Insubordination in Title VII Cases, 10 HARV. L. &
POL Y REV. 2, 22 29, 37 47 (2016).
172. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 22 (1993).
173. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 427 29 (2013).
174. As union representatives are often not supervisors, the standard applicable to liability for
s per isor harassmen is no rele an o his Commen s foc s on he in ersec ion be een Ti le VII
and NLRA standards for evaluating inappropriate conduct by a union representative. This Comment
will focus on the standard applicable to coworker or non-employee harassment.
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en ironmen crea ed b a s per isor s harassmen hen he s per isor
takes a tangible employment action.175 Such actions can include a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits. 176
When a non-supervisory coworker creates the hostile work
en ironmen , co r s anal e an emplo er s liabili
nder a negligence
standard.177 The standard looks at whether the employer acted reasonably
to prevent or correct harassment it knew about, or should reasonably have
known about.178 In other words, employers must take corrective action
reasonabl calc la ed o end he harassmen as soon as he ha e no ice
of the conduct, even if the harassment has not yet created a hostile work
environment.179 Co r s m s consider he her he emplo er s response
to each incident of harassment is proportional to the incident and
reasonably calculated to end the harassment and prevent future harassing
behavior. 180 The type of action that will be appropriate to end the
harassment will vary case-by-case. In some situations, a warning or
suspension may be appropriate, whereas others may require discharge or
transfer.181 While it is not a complete defense, employers can demonstrate
that they are preventing workplace harassment by implementing effective
175. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
176. Id. ( [S] ch as hiring, firing, failing o promo e, reassignmen i h significan l differen
responsibili ies, or a decision ca sing a significan change in benefi s. ). In defining a s per isor, he
Supreme Court has held that a supervisor is someone ho an emplo er has empo ered o ake
angible emplo men ac ions agains he ic im. Vance, 570 U.S. at 431. Additionally, when the
s per isor s harassmen does no res l in a angible emplo men ac ion, an emplo er ma escape
liability by es ablish as an affirma i e defense, ha (1) he emplo er e ercised reasonable care o
prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take
advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided. Id. at 424 (first
citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); and then citing Burlington Indus.,
524 U.S. at 765).
177. Vance, 570 U.S. at 424, 427 ( If the harassing emplo ee is he ic im s co-worker, the
employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions. ); see also Doe v.
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 716 (7th Cir. 2006).
178. See EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 669 70 (4th Cir. 2011); Erickson v. Wis. Dep t of
Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 605 06 (7th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Waste Mgmt., 361 F.3d 1021, 1029 30 (7th
Cir. 2004); Joens v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 41 (8th Cir. 2004); McGinest v. GTE
Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1119 21 (9th Cir. 2004).
179. EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 319 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Amirmokri v.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1131 32 (4th Cir. 1995)); see Erickson, 469 F.3d at 605
06; Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 28 (D. Nev. 1992); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(f) (2019).
180. Scarberry v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 328 F.3d 1255, 1259 60 (10th Cir. 2003).
181. See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 343 44 (6th Cir. 2008); Bailey v.
Runyon, 167 F.3d 466, 467 68 (8th Cir. 1999).
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anti-discrimination policies.182
Employer liability can also extend beyond the workplace, and beyond
interactions between solely employees. Employers can be liable for nonemployee harassment that occurs inside or outside of the workplace.183
For example, employers may be responsible for a non-emplo ee s se al
harassmen of emplo ees in he orkplace hen he emplo er knows or
should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action. 184 Employers can also be liable for
harassment that occurs outside the workplace when that conduct affects
an emplo ee s percei ed rea men inside he orkplace, h s crea ing a
hostile work environment.185 When an employee is harassed outside the
workplace, such as on social media, a trip for work, or a picket line,
employers who do nothing to prevent or correct harassment may be liable
if he cond c affec s he emplo ee s ork life.186
C.

The Board s Precedent for E al ating Raciall or Se all
Offensive Language or Conduct Likely Conflicts with Federal AntiDiscrimination Laws

In certain circumstances, NLRB precedent protects employees who
engage in profane, racist, or sexist outbursts.187 The conflict between this
precedent and federal anti-discrimination laws may protect intolerable
behavior in the workplace and subject employers to potential liability
under laws like Title VII, especially because employers can be held liable
182. Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that an employer s
written harassment policy was relevant to the negligence analysis in determining employer liability
for harassment); see also Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1027 28.
183. Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1024; Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th
Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., No. C94-790C, 1995 WL 569446, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
8, 1995) ( Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
in imida ion, ridic le, and ins l . The alleged harassmen here as ins iga ed b a FedE customer
and directed at a FedEx employee during the course and scope of her employment. FedEx cannot
escape the dictates of Title VII on the fortuitous ground that its employees are couriers whose duties
take them onto the premises of FedEx customers. (citations omitted)).
184. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2019).
185. See Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 63 n.4 (1st Cir. 2019) (finding that Facebook
messages could be considered when determining if an employee s harassment created a hostile work
environment, particularly where they were about workplace conduct and were sent by someone who
worked with the plaintiff).
186. Fed. Express, 1995 WL 569446, at *2 4; Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958,
966 69 (9th Cir. 2002).
187. See Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 972 (2014); Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505
(2015); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (2016), enforced, 866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir.
2017).
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for harassment created by employees or nonemployees.188 To comply with
the NLRA, an employer may be forced to continue bargaining with union
members who are creating a hostile workplace and may not be allowed to
discipline employees for engaging in conduct that violates federal law.
This makes it difficult for an employer to abide by its obligations under
both federal anti-discrimination laws and the NLRA, and it could leave
the employer vulnerable to a discrimination claim under Title VII. The
court in Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation, National Ass n v.
NLRB189 addressed this discrepancy when it noted the issues that
employers face when the Board finds unlawful behavior to be protected
under the NLRA: employers are subject to civil liability if they fail to
maintain a workplace free of harassment, but some abusive language
protected under he NLRA can constitute verbal harassment triggering
liabili
nder s a e or federal la . 190 Th s, o bar or limi an emplo er s
abili o ins la e i self from s ch liabili is o place i in a ca ch 22. 191
1.

NLRB Precedent Protecting Racially or Sexually Offensive
Language/Conduct

In Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC,192 the Board found
the employer had violated the NLRA by terminating employee Andrew
Williams af er he ro e a se all offensi e s a emen on he emplo er s
overtime signup sheets.193 This event occurred after the Union and the
employer reached an impasse during bargaining, leading to the
emplo er s nila eral implemen a ion of a ne o er ime sched ling
system.194 Under the new policy, employees interested in working
overtime could sign up on a sheet posted on a bulletin board outside the
lunchroom.195 The employees who opposed the new system began calling
he o er ime sign p shee s a h[*]re board, clearl impl ing ha hose
who signed it were compromising their loyalty to the Union and their
co orkers in order o benefi hemsel es and accommoda e he

188.
*3.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1024; Folkerson, 107 F.3d at 756; Fed. Express, 1995 WL 569446, at
253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 27.
Id.
366 N.L.R.B. No. 131 (July 24, 2018).
Id., slip op. at 1.
Id.
Id.
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employer.196 The erm h[*]re board became a common e pression,
freq en l
ered e en b s per isors. 197 The Board found no evidence
that the employer censored or punished employees for using the
expression.198 During the ongoing dispute regarding the overtime policy,
Williams ro e
h[*]re board a he op of he o er ime sign p
sheets.199 The employer suspended, and ultimately terminated, Williams
for
illf ll and deliberately engaging in insulting and harassing
conduct. 200
The Board held, contrary to the ALJ, that the employer violated the Act
when it terminated Williams.201 It concluded that Williams was engaged
in pro ec ed ac i i
hen he ro e wh[*]re board on he o er ime
sign p shee s beca se his ac as a con in a ion and o gro h of he
emplo ees bo co and opposi ion o he Responden s implemen a ion
of an o er ime polic . 202 Applying the Atlantic Steel test, the Board
concluded that Williams s pro ec ed ac i i
as no so egregio s as o
lose he NLRA s pro ec ion.203
The NLRB found the location factor neutral or slightly in favor of
losing he Ac s pro ec ion.204 The signup sheets were in a highlytrafficked work area right outside of the lunchroom.205 Th s, Williams s
se is e pression
as cer ain o be seen b emplo ees. 206 However,
beca se he eekl sign p shee s ere emporar in na re and co ld
ha e been easil remo ed or replaced, he Board concl ded ha
Williams s conduct did not disrupt work or interfere with the use of the
signup sheets.207
As to the subject matter of the dispute, the NLRB found it strongly
fa ored re aining he Ac s pro ec ion.208 Other employees previously had
pro es ed he emplo er s ne o er ime polic and had sed the same
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. ( Indeed, there appears to have been a general laxity toward profane and vulgar language
in the workplace. ).
199. Id., slip op. at 2.
200. Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC v. NLRB, 945 F.3d 546, 549 51 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
201. Constellium, slip op. at 4.
202. Id., slip op. at 2.
203. Id., slip. op. at 3.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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expression as Williams
h[*]re board. 209 Thus, the Board concluded
ha Williams s cond c and se of he erm as direc l rela ed o he
ongoing employee opposition of the new policy.210
The NLRB fo nd ha he na re of Williams s cond c fa ored
protection of the Act.211 It noted that his outburst was spontaneous and
direc ed a his co orkers and his emplo er, no j s an ac of mere
andalism. 212 While he Board ackno ledged ha Williams s ord
choice
as harsh and arg abl
lgar, i no ed that the expression
reflec ed his and his co orkers s rong feelings abo
he ongoing
disp e rela ed o he ne polic .213 Referring to the norms of the
orkplace, he Board no ed ha he emplo er s fail re o discipline
emplo ees for heir se of he e pression h[*]re board and general
tolerance of profanity in the workplace weakened any argument that
Williams s e pression as egregio s.214
Finally, the NLRB concluded that the provocation factor was neutral.215
The emplo er s nila eral implemen a ion of the new overtime policy
precipitated a labor dispute and employee protest.216 The Board noted that
Williams s ac as a response o he emplo ees bo co and his belief
that the implementation of the new policy violated the terms of the expired
collective-bargaining agreement.217 However, it also found that
Williams s ac as no an immedia e reac ion o an nfair labor prac ice
or any type of uncivil conduct by the employer.218
In Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,219 an employee on a picket line shouted
obscenities at predominantly African-American replacement workers,
incl ding He , did o bring eno gh KFC for e er one? and He
an bod smell ha ? I smell fried chicken and a ermelon. 220 Fellow
picke ers allegedl la ghed a he emplo ee s offensi e comments,

209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id., slip. op. at 4.
216. Id., slip. op. at 3.
217. Id.
218. Id., slip. op. at 4 (noting that it was not a reaction to an unfair labor practice because the Board
had not yet deemed the implementation of the new policy unfair).
219. 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (May 17, 2016), enforced, 866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2017).
220. Id., slip. op. at 4.
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mocking the replacement workers in the process.221 The employer fired
the employee based on his comments made during the strike because the
commen s iola ed he compan s an i-harassmen polic and he nion s
conduct rules.222
The Board, affirming the ALJ s r ling, req ired he emplo ee s
reins a emen , concl ding ha he NLRA pro ec ed he emplo ee s se of
racial slurs on the picket line.223 The ALJ concl ded ha he emplo ee s
conduct was racist and offensive, but under the Clear Pine Mouldings,
Inc.224 s andard, did no end o coerce or in imida e emplo ees, nor did
i
raise a reasonable likelihood of an imminen ph sical
confrontation. 225 Addi ionall , he emplo ee s s a emen s
ere
unaccompanied by any threatening behavior or physical acts of
in imida ion. 226 These findings were consistent with clearly established
Board preceden holding ha a s riker s or picke er s se of e en he
most vile language and/or gestures, standing alone, does not forfeit the
protection of the Act, so long as those actions do not constitute a threat. 227
2.

Racially or Sexually Offensive Language/Conduct Similar to That
Protected by NLRB Precedent is Found by Courts to Violate Title
VII

To avoid liability for harassment, employers have an obligation to take
prompt, effective action to stop and prevent harassing conduct in violation
of Title VII. Consequently, an employer that refrains from remedial action
because it is trying to meet NLRA obligations may find itself facing
liability under Title VII. This section compares similar conduct that
violates Title VII but is protected under the NLRA.
In Howley v. Town of Stratford,228 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
221. Id.
222. Id., slip. op. at 5.
223. Id., slip. op. at 1, 5, 12.
224. 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985); see supra
section I.B.
225. Cooper Tire, slip. op. at 5 8, 10. ( [In Clear Pine Mouldings, the Board adopted a test] for
de ermining he her erbal hrea s b s rikers direc ed a fello emplo ees j s if an emplo er s
refusal to reinstate. According to that test, an employer can lawfully deny reinstatement to a striker if
his misconduct is such that under the circumstances, it may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate
employees in the rights protected under the Act . . . . Since the Clear Pine Mouldings standard is an
objective one, it does not involve an inquiry into whether any particular employee was coerced or
intimidated. (citations omitted)).
226. Id., slip. op. at 8.
227. Id.
228. 217 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2000).

Gibbons (Do Not Delete)

2020]

10/15/2020 10:54 AM

LICENSE TO OFFEND

1523

held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment and
dismissing he plain iff s hos ile-work-environment claim.229 The case
involved a female firefighter who brought a Title VII action against the
town and her coworker, alleging both sexual harassment and failure to
promote.230 The court noted that considering the totality of the
circumstances, the co orker s cond c could reasonably be viewed as
ha ing in olerabl al ered [ he plain iff s] ork en ironmen . 231 The
co r b ffered i s concl sion b finding ha he co orker did no simpl
make a few offensive comments; nor did he air his views in private; nor
were his comments merely obscene without an apparent connection to [the
plain iff s] abili o perform her job. 232 The coworker made obscene
comments on one occasion, but did so at length, loudly, and in front of a
large group of the female plaintiff s male s bordina es.233 His comments
included allegations that the plaintiff had only gained her position by
performing sexual acts.234 Beca se a firefigh er s s ccess of en depends
on he unquestioning execution of line-of-command orders in emergency
situa ions, gender-based skepticism as to the competence of a
commanding officer ma easil diminish[] he respec accorded he
officer by subordinates and thereby impair[] her ability to lead in the lifethreatening circumstances often faced by firefighters. 235 The court
concl ded, as a ma er of la , ha a ra ional j ror co ld ie s ch a
irade as h milia ing and res l ing in an in olerable al era ion of Ho le s
orking condi ions. 236
Likewise, in EEOC v. Central Wholesalers, Inc.,237 the Fourth Circuit
Co r of Appeals re ersed he dis ric co r s gran of s mmar j dgmen
to the defendant, Central Wholesalers.238 The plain iff s co orkers sed
the word b***h on a daily basis when referring to women, had Pla bo
items in the office, watched porn next to the plaintiff, and had
screensavers depicting partially naked women.239 One coworker called the

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
573 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 179.
Id. at 175.
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plain iff a b***h a n mber of imes d ring one o b rs a ork.240 The
court also noted that multiple of he plain iff s co orkers sed he ord
n****r in her presence on a reg lar basis, and one co orker called he
plain iff a [B]lack s pid n****r and o her raciall deroga or erms
during a single outburst at work.241 The court concluded that a reasonable
jury could find that the plaintiff perceived the harassment based on her
race and gender to be sufficiently abusive or hostile, as she had
complained that she found the harassment objectionable and it caused her
emotional distress.242 Additionally, the court held that a reasonable jury
could find that the gender-based and race-based harassment was
objectively severe or pervasive.243 Its conclusion was supported by
e idence ha he plain iff s co orkers sed offensi e and deroga or
ords like b***h and n****r in he orkplace on a reg lar basis.244
These cases illustrate how the NLRA potentially protects individuals
when they engage in one type of behavior, while Title VII may not.
Another key difference is that under Title VII, courts generally consider
bo h he emplo er s obliga ions nder federal an i-discrimination laws
and he alleged harasser s cond c . B in NLRA cases, he Board rarel ,
if e er, considers he emplo er s obliga ions o main ain a harassmen free workplace under anti-discrimination laws.
D.

The NLRB s O tdated Vie s of Protected Union Speech O erlook
the Changes in Our Culture

The boundaries of tolerated workplace behavior have evolved
drastically over the past few decades due to growing social pressure to
establish workplaces that value civility, respect, and inclusion. Employers
and workers alike have expressed a commitment to these values. NLRB
standards, however, have allowed profanity, vulgarity, obscenity, and
harassment in the workplace under the guise of being part of industrial life
or norms of the workplace. These standards are outdated and
unproductive. Since the enactment of the NLRA eighty-five years ago, the
type of behavior that is tolerated both in and outside of the workplace has
changed drastically.
One societal revolution at the forefront of this change in tolerated
240. Id.
241. Id. ( In addition, both Tony and DaBay kept blue-colored mop-head dolls in their offices and
had he dolls hanging from nooses hich ere ied aro nd he dolls necks. ).
242. Id. at 176.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 176 77.
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workplace behavior is the #MeToo movement.245 The movement emerged
in late 2017 and challenges workplace conduct that previously went
unchecked.246 It encourages and empowers victims of workplace sexual
harassment and abuse to come forward, and for organizations to reexamine the issues plaguing their workplaces.247 One possible explanation
for this shift is that workplace cultures in the 1970s paid insufficient
attention to employee complaints about harassment. The movement has
prompted state legislatures to re-evaluate certain legal standards and
introduce new bills governing workplace conduct that limit certain types
of speech and protect workers.248 Some of the new legislation altered the
s andard ha harassmen m s be considered severe or pervasive o be
a hostile work environment.249 Others extended legal protections against
harassment beyond just employees to contractors, interns, volunteers, and
students.250 The new legislation also aims to promote transparency when
handling harassment claims by requiring certain employers or agencies to
report investigations and settlements.251 Many states also considered
requiring anti-harassment policies in the workplace, even though these are
not required by federal law.252 Finally, some lawmakers tried to tighten
employer liability for harassment in the workplace by ensuring they would
be held legally responsible even if an individual did not make a
245. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146, 1147 49 (2019).
246. Id.; see #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIBUNE (July 2, 2020, 10:49 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/Z9R4-WNHM].
247. Sindhu Sundar, How #MeToo Is Changing Internal Investigations, LAW360 (Jan. 28, 2018,
9:17 PM EST), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2018/01/how_metoo_
is_changing_internal_investigations.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGM7-AWP9].
248. ANDREA JOHNSON ET AL., NAT L WOMEN S L. CTR., PROGRESS IN ADVANCING ME TOO
WORKPLACE REFORMS IN #20STATESBY2020, at 2 (2019), https://nwlc-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpath
dns.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/20-States-By-2020-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNP7-6LA3]
(noting that by the end of 2018, nearly 300 organizations and 300 state legislators from 40 states came
together to call for strengthened protections against sexual harassment and violence in the workplace);
id. ( [S] a e legisla ors ha e in rod ced aro nd 200 bills o s reng hen pro ec ions agains orkplace
harassment in the past two years, and to date, 15 states have passed ne pro ec ions. ). While
Congress has not passed substantive legislature on the issue, Senator Patty Murray and Representative
Katherine Clark introduced the BE HEARD bill in an effort to address harassment in the workplace.
Id. at 4 (citing BE HEARD in the Workplace Act, S. 1082, 116th Cong. (2019)).
249. See CAL. GOV T CODE § 12923 (West 2020); Assemb. B. 8421, 2019 2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2019).
250. See H. Substitute 1 for H.B. 360, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2018); S.B. 7507C,
2017 2018 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018); H.B. 679, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019).
251. See Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of 2018, S.B. 1010, 2018 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); S.B. 0075, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019).
252. See S.B. 726, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); S.B. 6471, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2018); Vermont Act 183, H.707, 2017 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018).
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complaint.253 These new laws hold employers liable for harassment by any
supervisor with the power to make employment status decisions.254
The #MeToo movement has empowered individuals to be less tolerant
of abusive workplace environments and more comfortable reporting
violations or harassing behaviors in the workplace. During 2018, the
EEOC filed sixty-six lawsuits involving unlawful workplace harassment,
and forty-one alleging sexual harassment.255 This was more than a 50%
increase from the number of lawsuits filed the prior year, while the
number of charges filed by employees alleging sexual harassment
increased by over 12% from the prior year.256 Additionally, the EEOC
found probable cause to believe that unlawful harassment had occurred in
nearly 1,200 charges filed, a nearly 25% increase from 2017.257 These
statistics demonstrate the growing intolerance for harassment in the
workplace. In most orkplaces oda , he pre ailing reali ies reflec a
commitment to preventing and rooting out discrimination that takes the
form of se all or raciall profane or in imida ing speech. 258
Similar to addressing issues of sexual harassment, new movements are
also challenging socie s olerance of racial harassmen in he orkplace.
The Black Lives Matter movement, which began in 2016, is one example
of a revolution that has put a spotlight on the racial inequity and injustice
that permeates society.259 While this movement originated with a focus on
racism within the criminal justice system, it has prompted a discussion
regarding the ways in which racism arises in other areas of life, such as
the workplace.260 In almos e er
orkplace in America, [r]acial
253. See Assemb. B. 8421, 2019 2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
254. See H. Substitute 1 for H.B. 360, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2018); H.B. 679, 2019
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019). These states expanded employer accountability for harassment by lower-level
supervisors, counter to the Vance Supreme Court decision. That decision limited a victim s ability to
recover under federal law when they experience sexual harassment by low-level supervisors (meaning
employees without the ability to hire or fire). The Court refused to hold employers vicariously liable
for the harassment of employees by low level supervisors. Many state courts follow federal law
interpretations, like the Vance decision, when interpreting state harassment laws. See JOHNSON ET
AL., supra note 248, at 11.
255. What You Should Know: EEOC Leads the Way in Preventing Workplace Harassment, EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM N (Oct. 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/preventingworkplace-harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/QKM5-WBPS].
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. Brief of Coal. for a Democratic Workforce as Amici Curie at 15, Gen. Motors LLC, 368
N.L.R.B. No. 68 (2017) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) [hereinafter Democratic
Workforce].
259. What We Believe, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/what-we-believe/
[https://perma.cc/9M3B-RXRN].
260. Emily Peck, The Reckoning Over Workplace Racism Has Begun, HUFFPOST (June 9, 2020,
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discrimina ion is a problem ha s b bbling nder he s rface. 261 For
example, Mark Luckie, a former Facebook employee, wrote a statement
about how the lack of Black representation at Facebook negatively
impacts the work environment for Black employees and the experiences
that the Black community has on Facebook.262 During his time at
Facebook, he describes how Black employees frequently complained
abo co orkers and managers ho called hem aggressi e or hos ile for
how they share their thoughts, and abo being accosted by campus
security.263 By ignoring the mistreatment and marginalization of Black
emplo ees, L ckie asser ed ha Facebook s fe Black emplo ees ill
no an o remain a he compan , hich in rn ma undermine the
quality and reach of [the] products. 264 Similar to the #MeToo movement,
the Black Lives Matter movement will likely empower Black employees
and other employees of color to share stories of mistreatment and protest
racial harassment and inequities both in and outside the workplace.265
Such a movement highlights the issues that the Black community may
5:57 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/like-me-too-but-for-racism_n_5edfee15c5b64843bde
220d0 [https://perma.cc/8C9X-T6QD] ( Like they have been for years, Black people and other people
of color are calling out not just police brutality, but also racism, discrimination, harassment and racial
bias in he orkplace. ); Jon H man, Why #BlackLivesMatter Should Matter to Employers,
WORKFORCE (July 13, 2016), https://www.workforce.com/news/why-blacklivesmatter-shouldmatter-to-employers [https://perma.cc/W2G7-8BWT] ( If America is polarized over these issues, so
are o r orkers. ).
261. Arran Heal, Is Racial Discrimination the Next MeToo?, MEDIATE (Aug. 2019),
https://www.mediate.com/articles/heal-racial-discrimination.cfm [https://perma.cc/PW4J-USS7].
262. Jessica Guynn, Facebook Has a Problem With Black People, Former Employee Charges,
USA TODAY (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/11/27/facebook-hasproblem-black-people-former-employee-says/2126056002/ [https://perma.cc/9EQN-TLY8] ( Under
pressure to make its workforce more closely resemble the more than 2 billion users it serves, Facebook
increased the number of black employees to 4 percent of U.S. employees in 2018 from 2 percent in
2016. Yet just 1 percent of technical roles are held by blacks and 2 percent of leadership roles. Black
women account for an even smaller fraction of the workforce. Overall, Facebook employs 278 black
women out of a U.S. workforce of just under 20,000. ).
263. Id. Luckie also notes how black people here are scared of talking about the issues that affect
hem beca se he don see his as a s ppor i e compan . Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Id.
265. Peck, supra note 260 ( The fo nder of lifes le re ailer Ban.Do, Jen Gotch, announced she
would take a leave of absence after a former employee shared a detailed post describing both covert
and overt racism at the company. The CEO of clothing company Reformation is also under fire after
former employees spoke up about racism. A reckoning could be at hand. ); Jessica Guynn,
Zuckerberg Reprimands Facebook Staff Defacing Black Lives Matter, USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/02/25/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-black-livesmatter-diversity/80933694/ [https://perma.cc/MC5S-ATQN]; Sam Wood, Jefferson Health Fires
Employee Over Racist Facebook Post, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 14, 2016),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/health/20160715_A_racist_Facebook_post_leads_to_firing_of_Jef
ferson_employee.html [https://perma.cc/W5LU-66ZZ].
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face if he find hemsel es s bjec ed o he NLRB s an iq a ed
standards.
In the wake of these movements, even the NLRB appears to be aware
that its precedent is outdated. In July 2020, after months of litigation and
a flurry of amicus briefs urging the NLRB to overrule its precedent
protecting profane and racially-charged outbursts,266 the NLRB issued its
decision in General Motors LLC267 that acknowledged the tension
between federal anti-discrimination la s and he NLRA s speech
protections as applied to employees.268 The decision states that the NLRA
is not meant to protect abusive conduct and, as such, the NLRB must
interpret the NLRA in a way that allows employers to maintain a
workplace free from harassment by other employees.269 However, the case
focuses on the conduct of an employee union member. It does not address
what if any right the employer has to refuse to interact with a nonemployee union representative so that it can keep its workplace
harassment-free without violating its duty to bargain with the union.
The NLRB has taken the first step in making a change, but there is a
long a o go o disman le he NLRB s pa ern of deciding cases
seemingly without any consideration of employer liability under Title VII
or he her he emplo ee s speech iola es Ti le VII.270 Much of the
speech that the NLRB has protected may violate federal antidiscrimination laws, as it would create a hostile work environment. The

266. See Press Release, Na l Lab. Rels. Bd., Board Invites Briefs Regarding NLRA Protection for
Profane or Offensive Statements (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/newsstory/board-invites-briefs-regarding-nlra-protection-for-profane-or-offensive
[https://perma.cc/B4BV-HZJ8]. The Board invited interested parties to address five questions: (1)
when should profane language or sexually or racially offensive speech lose the protection of the Act;
(2) to what extent should the realities of industrial life protection of speech under the NLRA remain
applicable with respect to profanity or language that is offensive to others on the basis of race or sex;
(3) should the Board continue to take into account the norms of the workplace, like whether profanity
is commonplace and tolerated, in determining whether an employee s outburst is unprotected; (4)
should the Board continue to follow its previous standards to the extent it permitted a finding in those
cases that racially or sexually offensive language did not lose the protection of the Act; and (5) [ ]ha
relevance should the Board accord to antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII in determining whether
an emplo ee s s a emen s lose he pro ec ion of he Ac ? Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68,
slip op. at 2 3 (Sept. 5, 2019) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) (describing the NLRB s
notice and invitation to file briefs in the case).
267. 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21, 2020) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242).
268. Id., slip op. at 6 8.
269. Id., slip op. at 7 8.
270. See supra Parts I, II, & III. In General Motors, he Board s a ed ha he o err le all per inent
cases o he e en ha he are inconsis en i h his holding. General Motors, slip op. at 2.
However, this decision is the first of its kind, and it remains to be seen how this decision will be
interpreted and applied in the future.
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fact that the NLRB just issued the General Motors decision addressing
how federal anti-discrimination laws relate to employee and union rights
under the NLRA adds to the relevance of what this Comment seeks to
address. Toda s socie demands ha he NLRA no longer shield he
previously protected, egregious workplace behavior.
IV. THE TIME IS RIPE FOR THE NLRB TO STOP PROTECTING
HARASSING SPEECH
NLRB precedent has protected employees engaged in union activities
even if they use profanity and racially- or sexually-charged language that
is wholly inappropriate in a modern workplace.271 The Board s s andards
for assessing protected conduct under the NLRA have allowed the Act to
become a shield for unlawful discrimination, inappropriate language,
threats of violence, and racist speech.272 The Board has protected
employees who have targeted coworkers based on their race or gender,
with obscenity or violence, while ignoring the harm inflicted on the
affected employees and the work environment. Its speech and bad faith
bargaining standards have also shielded union representatives who create
hostile environments while engaging in union work. Even though the
Board has recognized that the differences in power between workers and
employers can cause emotions to flare up during discussions about
working conditions,273 this does not mean that conduct should be immune
from repercussions. Union members are entitled to a wide range of
freedom and latitude in their communication, but it should not be
unlimited,274 something that even the NLRB recognizes.275 Now is the
time for the NLRB to fully abandon its current understanding of bad faith
bargaining and protected speech, and as this Comment outlines shape

271. See supra section III.C. Board law currently weighs so heavily in favor of protecting profane,
sexually offensive, and racially offensive language that it can almost be deemed to promote such
behavior. Brief of USPS as Amicus Curiae at 1, Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (2017)
(Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242).
272. Michael H. LeRoy, Slurred Speech: How the NLRB Tolerates Racism, 8 COLUM. J. RACE &
L. 209, 224 (2018).
273. See Dreis & Krump Mfg., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 309 (1975).
274. See supra Part I.
275. See supra section I.B; Gen. Motors LLC, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 8 (July 21, 2020)
(Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) (noting that [a]b si e speech and cond c (e.g., profane
ad hominem attack or racial slur) is not protected by the Act and is differentiable from speech or
conduct that is protected by Section 7 (e.g., articulating a concerted grievance or patrolling a picket
line) ); see also Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 985 86 (2014) (Member Johnson,
dissen ing) (no ing ha emplo ees engaged in pro ec ed nion ac i i ies are permi ed some lee a
o engage in o b rs s nder he NLRA, no s bs an ial lee a , [] ma im m lee a , and cer ainl
no nres rained freedom ).
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its decisions around the parameters for lawful workplace conduct
established by federal anti-discrimination law, regardless of the identity
of the alleged harasser. Harmonizing federal anti-discrimination law and
he NLRA s s andards for permissible orkplace nion speech ill enable
employers to address offensive statements or conduct that may violate
anti-discrimination laws. This, in turn, will enable the NLRB and courts
o s rike a balance be een an emplo er s d
o compl
i h federal
anti-discrimination laws and the NLRA, while still affording employees
protection to engage in impassioned speech.
A.

Most NLRB Precedent Has Protected Conduct That Likely Violates
Federal Anti-Discrimination Law

The Board s pre io s decisions, hich ha e pro ec ed emplo ees
hateful, profane, or obscene speech, have signaled to union
representatives and employees that the NLRA can be invoked as a shield
against legitimate responses to such action.276 However, [i] is bo h
prepos ero s and ins l ing o ensconce in o labor la he ass mp ion
ha emplo ees are incapable of organi ing a nion or e ercising heir
other statutory rights under the National Labor Relations Act without
resor [ing] o ab si e or hrea ening lang age arge ed a a person s
gender or race. 277 While its new decision in General Motors is a step in
the right direction,278 the NLRB still has a long way to go to harmonize
he NLRA s pro ec ion of nion represen a i e cond c i h federal an idiscrimination laws.
Racist, sexist, and potentially violent speech is harmful to an
emplo ee s righ o a safe and discrimina ion-free workplace.279
Addi ionall , inci ili in he orkplace is often an antecedent to
orkplace harassmen , as i crea es a clima e of general derision and
disrespec in hich harassing beha iors are olera ed. 280 Racially or
276. As ario s organi a ions no ed in heir amic s briefs o he NLRB on his iss e, in he 21s
cen r , an aria ion on a she had i coming e cep ion is simpl indefensible. Democratic
Workforce, supra note 258.
277. Consol. Commc ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Millett, J., concurring)
(citing Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 19, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
278. See supra section III.D.
279. In 2016, an EEOC task force published a report investigating the nature and scope of
workplace harassment. CHAI R. FELDBLUM AND VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: REPORT OF THE
CO-CHAIRS (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/select-task-force-study-harassment-workplace
[https://perma.cc/MU53-CALM]. The task force found that incivility in the workplace often leads to
workplace harassment. Id.
280. Id. at 55.
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sexually offensive comments serve only to harm those to whom they are
directed.
The Board has held that employees who are engaged in protected
ac i i ies generall do no lose he pro ec i e man le of he Ac simpl
beca se heir ac i i con ra enes an emplo er s r les or policies. 281 But
such a standard may render an employer helpless in maintaining a civil
and discrimination-free workplace, exposing it to potential liability from
ic ims of harassmen . The Board s decisions m s all be bro gh p o
date with modern cultural and workplace norms. The Supreme Court has
noted that the primary objective of Title VII is no o pro ide redress b
o a oid harm. 282 As he EEOC s gges s, an emplo er s d
o pre en
or alle ia e harassmen in he orkplace is bes ser ed b enco raging
employees to complain of harassing conduct before i becomes
actionable.283 Allowing employers to put policies in place that limit the
possibility of workplace harassment would ideally prevent an actionable
hostile work environment from developing.284
B.

Recommendations for Harmoni ing the NLRB s Decisions ith
Federal Anti-Discrimination Law

The modern workplace demands that the Board stop excusing
offensive, harassing language as incidental to the exercise of workplace
rights in a confrontational or adversarial atmosphere. The Board must
continue to harmonize its standards with federal anti-discrimination laws
like Title VII because the NLRA should not preempt such laws.285 Instead,
281. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 21 (May 6, 2019) (citing Crowne
Plaza LaGuardia, 357 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1101 (2011)).
282. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
283. EEOC, supra note 159; see also Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (concluding that a Black employee suing an employer regarding a single, racially
derogatory comment was able to establish a retaliation claim under Title VII).
284. See Honda of Am. Mfg., 334 N.L.R.B. 746, 748 (2001); Avondale Indus., 333 N.L.R.B. 622,
637 38 (2001) (noting employer was justifiably concerned about the disruption that the employee s
offensive speech would cause in the workplace).
285. See Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC v. NLRB, 945 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2019);
NLRB General Counsel, supra note 22; EEOC, supra note 159; Brief of Hum. Res. Pol y Ass n as
Amicus Curiae, Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (2017) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA208242) [hereinafter HR Policy]; S. S.S. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942). The NLRB s General
Counsel suggests that the NLRB should
overrule its holdings in Plaza Auto, Pier Sixty, and Cooper Tire to the extent that they protect
outbursts and statements that in and of themselves create or have the potential to create violence
or a hostile work environment on the basis of a protected status such as race or gender.
NLRB General Counsel, supra note 22.
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conduct that rises to the level of harassment under Title VII, even if it does
not reach the current standard for bad faith bargaining or unprotected
speech, sho ld be considered o side he scope of he NLRA s
protections.286
The NLRA as no in ended o be a ool o disable an emplo er s
ability to discipline its employees, maintain a harassment-free workplace,
or keep its bargaining team members safe; using it in such a manner
corrupts its purpose.287 The S preme Co r has long held ha the Board
has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor
Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and
equally important Congressional objectives. 288 For example, as discussed
above in Constellium, the NLRB concluded that the employer violated the
NLRA hen i ermina ed an emplo ee ho ro e wh*re board on he
overtime signup sheets.289 However, on appeal to the Federal Court of
Appeals for he D.C. Circ i , he co r ref sed o phold he Board s
decision.290 The Co r concl ded ha hile he NLRB s decision did not
impermissibly depart from precedent without explana ion, he Board
failed, ho e er, o address he po en ial conflic be een i s
in erpre a ion of he NLRA and [ he emplo er s] obliga ions nder s a e

286. S ch a s andard o ld be in line i h he Board s pre io s ackno ledgemen s ha an
emplo ee s offensi e and personall denigra ing remarks alone can res l in loss of pro ec ion [ nder
he NLRA]. Pla a A o C r., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 286, 293 94 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Indian
Hills Care Ctr., 321 N.L.R.B. 144, 151 (1996) (noting that there are situations in which vulgar,
profane, and obscene language directed at supervisor or employer, uttered in the course of protected
union activity, may lose protection of the Act).
287. See NLRB General Counsel, supra note 22; EEOC, supra note 159 ( Gi en ha emplo ers
must address racist or sexist conduct that violates Title VII, and may need to do so even before the
conduct becomes actionable in order to avoid liability for negligence, the EEOC urges the NLRB to
consider a standard that permits employers to address such conduct, including by disciplining
emplo ees, as appropria e. ); HR Polic , supra note 285 (all noting that the NLRA should not
preempt federal anti-discrimination laws).
288. S. S.S., 316 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added); see also Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,
535 U.S. 137, 144, 147 (2002) ( Since So hern S.S. Co., e ha e accordingl ne er deferred o he
Board s remedial preferences where such preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and
policies unrelated to the NLRA. Thus, we have precluded the Board from enforcing orders found in
conflict with the Bankruptcy Code, rejected claims that federal antitrust policy should defer to the
NLRA, and precluded the Board from selecting remedies pursuant to its own interpretation of the
Interstate Commerce Act . . . . The So hern S.S. Co. line of cases es ablished ha here he Board s
chosen remedy trenches upon a federal s a e or polic o side he Board s compe ence o adminis er,
he Board s remed ma be req ired o ield. (citations omitted)); NMC Finishing v. NLRB, 101
F.3d 528, 530 32 (8th Cir. 1996) (denying enforcement of NLRB decision which had found a
picketer s conduct protected under the Act where he carried a sign saying Who is Rhonda F [with
an X through F] Sucking Today? ).
289. Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC, 366 N.L.R.B. No. 131 (July 24, 2018).
290. Constellium, 945 F.3d at 548 49.
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and federal eq al emplo men oppor ni la s. 291 The Court remanded
the case for the Board to address he conflic be een he emplo er s
obligation to maintain a harassment-free workplace and its ability to
discipline the employee under the Act.292 Accordingly, while the Board is
legall req ired o balance emplo ee s righ s nder he NLRA agains he
righ o a safe orkplace free of discrimina ion, he Board has erl
failed o [do] so. 293 In General Motors, the Board acknowledged that the
NLRA sho ld no con in e o read he Ac o empo er he Board o
referee what abusive conduct is severe enough for an employer to lawfully
discipline. [The NLRA s] d
is o pro ec emplo ees from in erference
in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. 294
For employers to prevent actionable hostile work environments and
alleviate themselves of liability related to their duty to bargain, they must
be able to act in response to inappropriate behavior that may support a
hostile work environment claim even when it occurs in conjunction with
union activity. Currently, in situations where union conduct directed at
members of the management team may constitute harassment under
Title VII, an employer that refuses to continue bargaining may face an
unfair labor practice penalty.295 Because General Motors did not analyze
ho an emplo er can address a nonemplo ee s beha ior hile complying
i h i s o her NLRA obliga ions, a nion represen a i e s offensi e
conduct would still be analyzed under the outdated bad faith bargaining
standard
i ho d e considera ion o he emplo er s righ s and
obligations under federal anti-discrimination laws. However, by fully
harmonizing Title VII and the NLRA, employers will be able to protect
their employees from a hostile work environment and avoid liability under
Title VII, without fear of violating the NLRA for refusing to bargain.296
Because Title VII requires employers to actively prevent and stop
unlawful harassment,297 employers must be able to protect their
employees by nipping in he b d he kinds of emplo ee cond c ha
co ld lead o a hos ile orkplace before an ac ionable hos ile

291. Id.
292. Id.
293. NLRB General Counsel, supra note 22.
294. See Gen. Motors LLC, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 8 (July 21, 2020) (Cases 14-CA197985 and 14-CA-208242)
295. See supra section II.D.
296. See supra Part II; c.f. Victoria Packing Corp., 332 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 (2000) (citing Sahara
Datsun, 278 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1986)).
297. See supra section III.A.
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workplace is created.298 Without congruence between the laws, the
employer faces a dilemma it is unable to insulate itself from liability
under both federal and state law for failing to maintain a harassment-free
workplace without also risking an unfair labor practice charge.299 To
eliminate this possibility, the Board should give deference and
considera ion o an emplo er s d ies nder federal an i-discrimination
la
hen de ermining if he NLRA pro ec s a nion member s federall
unlawful conduct. This deference should be given irrespective of whether
the union member is an employee or union representative, or whether the
cond c occ rs i hin he scope of he par ies o her righ s and obliga ions
under the Act.
Al ho gh some organi a ions ha e oiced concerns abo [g]raf ing a
code of etiquette onto the NLRA 300 that may be used to quell pro-union
activity,301 this perspective fails to acknowledge the change in
circumstances for determining appropriate workplace conduct since the
twentieth century.302 An employer cannot weaponize Title VII to quell
pro-union activity because it requires that employer discipline be
appropriately tailored to preventing or ending the workplace harassment.
Moreover, even under Title VII, courts have admonished that the law is
no a civility code. 303 Rather, conduct is only actionable under Title VII
when it is objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive, based on
protected characteristics, and is severe or pervasive.304 A union employee
ho feels ha he emplo er s response o he ac ion as no reasonably
consistent with preventing Title VII violations might seek relief from the
NLRB on the grounds that the response was instead motivated by antiunion sentiments. Assuming that the conduct did not immediately rise to
298. NLRB General Counsel, supra note 22.
299. See Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
see also Consol. Commc ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Millett, J., concurring)
( Conduct that is designed to humiliate and intimidate another individual because of and in terms of
ha person s gender or race sho ld be naccep able in he ork en ironmen . F ll s op. ).
300. Brief of Liuna Mid-Atl. Reg l Org. Coal. as Amici Curiae, Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B.
No. 68 (2017) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) [hereinaf er Li na] ( [E]nac ing a code of
etiquette onto the NLRA would be inconsistent with the modern cultural trends and long-standing
industrial reality. Everything from the popularity of adult-themed television to the frequently course
and profane language from the current President demonstrates that profane language is becoming
more accepted in everyday life, not less . . . . ).
301. Liuna, supra note 300; Brief of The Am. Fed. of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. as Amici
Curiae, Gen. Motors, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242).
302. Liuna, supra note 300; Brief of Nat l Nurses United as Amicus Curiae, Gen. Motors, 368
N.L.R.B. No. 68 (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242).
303. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
304. See supra Part III.
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the level of severe conduct, employers should be expected to impose
proportionate consequences that do not unduly impose upon union
emplo ees or represen a i es abili
o engage in nion ac i i ies.
Employees would still be able to express emotions during bargaining and
other discussions on workplace conditions, but in a manner that does not
create a hostile work environment under Title VII.
Federal anti-discrimination law is not wholly distinct from the NLRA;
both are pieces of the larger puzzle that is labor and employment law.
Following General Motors, the Board must continue to align its decisions
regarding bo h emplo ee and nion represen a i e s pro ec ed speech
under the Act with the standards defining hostile work environments
under federal anti-discrimination law. Because the Supreme Court has
pre io sl held ha he Board s r lings canno iola e federal la ,305 the
harmonization that this Comment calls for will require the Board to shape
its rulings around the parameters for lawful workplace conduct and
employer behavior set forth under federal anti-discrimination laws.306
Likewise, such harmonizing would not allow an employer to terminate
employees for all offensive conduct. Many instances of profanity or crude
behavior are not actionable under Title VII,307 and that same behavior
would remain protected under the NLRA. As a result, even if Title VII
governed conduct in the workplace alongside the NLRA, there remains
room for passionate advocacy.
CONCLUSION
Over the years, the NLRB has deployed the NLRA as a shield to protect
union members from discipline for conduct that would otherwise violate
federal anti-discrimination laws. Under NLRB precedent, employers and
unions may be forced to continue to bargain with a party who engages in
harassment that is actionable under Title VII, or risk an unfair labor
practice charge because the conduct does not constitute bad faith
bargaining. However, an employer does not have to and should not have
to wait to act until conduct reaches unlawfulness under the NLRA in
305. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144, 147 (2002).
306. This is something that even the Board itself acknowledged that it should be doing, specifically
when analyzing an employee s protected union speech under the Act. See Gen. Motors, 369 N.L.R.B.
No. 127 (July 21, 2020) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242).
307. Ziskie v. Mineta, 547 F.3d 220, 228 (4th Cir. 2008) ( But while no one condones boorishness,
there is a line between what can justifiably be called sexual harassment and what is merely crude
behavior. Profanity, while regrettable, is something of a fact of daily life. Flatulence, while offensive,
is no of en ac ionable, for Ti le VII is no a general ci ili code. The occasional off-color joke or
comment is a missive few of us escape. Were such things the stuff of lawsuits, we would be litigating
past sundown in ever so many circumstances. (citations omitted)).
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order to avoid liability. Harmonizing the NLRA and federal antidiscrimination laws would spare employers from inconsistent obligations,
especially during bargaining. Employers would be able to take affirmative
and effective steps, in compliance with their Title VII obligations, to
prevent or stop conduct that would lead to a hostile work environment.
Title VII s correc i e ac ion s andard, hich has been in erpre ed o
include a proportionality aspect, can provide guidance in evaluating
workplace conduct under the NLRA to ensure that employers are not
overreacting and taking severe action in response to actions that are
neither severe nor pervasive under Title VII.
Ultimately, this Comment proposes a standard that balances protecting
orkers and nion represen a i es righ s nder he NLRA b pro iding
some leeway for inappropriate outbursts associated with union activity,
and letting employers enforce their own workplace policies to promote a
healthier, more prosperous work environment. The NLRB has taken the
first step in remedying the harm created by its past precedent, but needs
o con in e harmoni ing i s s andards i h par ies respec i e d ies nder
the Act and their rights and obligations under federal anti-discrimination
laws, across all contexts and actors.

